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TITLE VII QUID PRO QUO AND HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS: CHANGING THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK COURTS USE TO DETERMINE WHETHER
CHALLENGED CONDUCT IS UNWELCOME
Elsie Mata*
In examining the nature of sexual harassment claims, the author challenges the
use of the "unwelcomeness" element to distinguish actionable conduct from non-
actionable conduct. The author contends that the "unwelcomeness" element demeans
women in two ways: (1) it assumes the male perspective and presumes that the
plaintiff appreciated the challenged conduct unless she proves otherwise; and
(2) it allows the defense to engage in intrusive, irrelevant, and damaging inquir-
ies as it attempts to refute the plaintiff's allegation that the challenged conduct
was unwelcome.
The author argues for three reforms. First, courts should shift the burden of proving
that the challenged behavior was unwelcome from the plaintiff to the defendant,
making "unwelcomeness" an affirmative defense rather than an element of the
plaintiff's prima facie case. Second, in order to curb the defense's ability to attack,
embarrass, or stigmatize the plaintiff courts should more narrowly define what is
"relevant" evidence pursuant to Rules 401 and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Finally, courts should diligently apply the procedural protections contained
in the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
avoid admitting embarrassing prejudicial, and ultimately irrelevant evidence.
INTRODUCTION
[T]he most amazing thing happened. A woman about four feet in
front of me suddenly reached around behind her She was completely
calm, but she gripped this guy's arm, held his hand up in the air, and
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in a loud, clear, commanding voice-carried all through the bus-she
said, "What was this hand doing on my ass?" She held on to his arm,
held his hand right up there.
The man who'd harassed her-three-piece suit, looked like some junior
executive type-didn't even try to deny it. Everyone knew his hand
had been exactly where she said it was. He turned bright red, looked
guilty as hell, and jumped off the bus at the first stop.'
Like the woman on the bus, other courageous, strong, and as-
sertive women are coming forward to change the cultural climate,
but more needs to be done to stop sexual harassment. After boldly
challenging unwelcome sexual conduct, the woman on the bus
may return to her home having reclaimed her dignity and having
suffered no financial loss. Workers who assert their right to be free
from unwanted sexual attention in the workplace, however, face
devastating economic and professional repercussions. They risk
being fired, being denied a promotion, suffering a reduction in
pay, losing a job title crucial to advancement, or being transferred
or reassigned to a different department or location with dimin-
ished responsibilities or fewer opportunities for professional
growth.2 These risks are substantial because work is critical to fi-
nancial independence and economic survival.3 An individual
should not have to "run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for
the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living" ;4 it is
"demeaning and disconcerting."
5
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19646 addresses this issue be-
cause it prohibits employers from discriminating against any
individual on the basis of sex. The word "sex" has been inter-
preted to include sexual harassment,8 which encompasses two
claims: a claim of quid pro quo and a claim of hostile environment
1. MARTHA J. LANGELAN, BACK OFF! How TO CONFRONT AND STOP SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT AND HARASSERS 21 (1993).
2. For examples of tangible job detriments, see infra notes 79-82 and accompanying
text.
3. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 7
(1979).
4. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11 th Cir. 1982).
5. Id.
6. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964), amended by 86 Stat. 103 (1972), 92 Stat.
2076 (1978), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to - 2000e-
17(1994)).
7. For the relevant statutory language, see infra note 26 and accompanying text.
8. See Mentor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,66-67 (1986).
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sexual harassment.9 Case law suggests that for either sexual har-
assment claim, the complainant, as part of her prima facie
showing, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she10
has not welcomed the challenged sexual conduct." In other words,
she must prove that she found the challenged conduct undesirable
or offensive or that she did not solicit, incite, or consent to the
sexual advances.12 Courts, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), and commentators justify the use of the un-
welcomeness element of sexual harassment claims as a tool to
distinguish socially useful or non-offensive conduct from action-
able sexual harassment.1 3 This element and the legal framework
courts use to determine what constitutes actionable conduct, how-
ever, create two problems. The first problem is that the current
legal framework unfairly places the burden of proving that the
challenged conduct was unwelcome on the complainant. The sec-
ond problem is that this framework surrounding the
unwelcomeness requirement may facilitate inappropriate defense
tactics during discovery and at trial.
First, placing the burden of proof on the complainant is unfair
because it invites the courts to inject their own notions of proper
sexual behavior in a way that hurts women.14 It hurts women be-
cause it focuses on the woman's conduct as seen from a man's
perspective. It perpetuates pernicious and demeaning stereotypes
about how women should, should not, or are presumed to behave.
It presumes that the plaintiff welcomed the challenged conduct
9. Id. at 65 (1986). For discussion regarding a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim,
see infra Part I.B. 1. For discussion regarding a hostile sexual harassment claim, see infra Part
I.B.2.
10. The author recognizes that both men and women can be victims of sexual harass-
ment and that both men and women can sexually harass members of either or both
genders. For convenience and because sexual harassment is almost exclusively practiced by
men against women, the author has chosen to use the pronoun "he" when referring to the
alleged harasser and "she" when referring to the complainant. See BARBARA LINDEMANN &
DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 5 & n.18 (1992) (citing a study
showing that sexual harassment was perpetrated nearly three times as often by men as by
women and noting that litigated cases are brought almost exclusively by women complain-
ing of harassment by men); Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, An Empirical Study of Sexual
Harassment Litigation, 1986-1996, at 11 (noting that an empirical study of sexual harass-
ment litigation demonstrated that only six percent of the plaintiffs are men), at 19-20
(noting that a different empirical study of sexual harassment litigation demonstrated that
ninety-two percent of the plaintiffs were women) (Jan. 13, 1999) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
11. See discussion infra Part II.A.
12. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 139-50 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
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and implies that she is to blame for the harassment. The burden of
proof is placed on the plaintiff even though she is a member of the
class of persons Title VII was designed to protect, even though she
is presumptively less powerful economically and socially than the
defendant, and even though psychological and sociological studies
demonstrate that women find a broader range of conduct offen-
sive than men do 15, and for that reason, men are more likely to
misinterpret female behavior. The burden of proof is placed on
the plaintiff even though the alleged harasser is generally the actor
versus the acted upon, even though he is in the best position to
guard against, to prevent, and to correct misbehavior, and even
though studies' 6 demonstrate women are not likely to file frivolous
claims.
Second, the current requirement that the plaintiff prove unwel-
comeness as a part of her prima facie case may enable defendants to
engage in intrusive, irrelevant, and damaging 7 inquiries. An inquiry
into whether a plaintiff welcomed a defendant's conduct may in-
flame prejudice or stigmatize the plaintiff as a liar, as a woman
scorned, or as a promiscuous woman unworthy of protection."'
These two problems needlessly discourage victims from filing
legitimate claims,' 9 leaving sexual harassment at work widespread
and underreported,2 0 Title VII's protections underutilized and in-
effective, and the victim forced to choose between economic
survival and sexual harassment. Part I of this Note provides back-
ground information about Title VI's prohibition against sexual
discrimination and about the two forms of sexual harassment
claims: quid pro quo and hostile environment. Part II outlines the
unwelcomeness element of sexual harassment claims, the kind of
conduct that courts consider in determining whether challenged
conduct is actionable, and the two problems associated with the
legal framework courts use to determine unwelcomeness. Finally,
Part III discusses three reforms courts may implement to resolve
these problems.
First, the Court should shift the burden of proving that the har-
assing behavior was unwelcome from the plaintiff to the
defendant. Rather than serving as an element of the plaintiffs
15. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 178-92 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 162, 178-86 and accompanying text.
19. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 833 (1991);Joan S. Weiner, Under-
standing Unwelcomeness in Sexual Harassment Law: Its History and a Proposal for Reform, 72
NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 621, 621 (1997).
20. See infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
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prima facie case, "unwelcomeness" should be treated as an affirma-
tive defense available to the defendant only after a prima facie case
has been established. Such a shift would stop demeaning and per-
nicious stereotyping, recognize that sexual harassment victims are
almost always less powerful socio-economically than their aggres-
sors, and account for perceptual differences between men and
women. Such a shift would place the burden on the actor, the per-
son most likely to misinterpret conduct, and the entity, the
employer, who is in the best position to curb abuses. Instead of re-
quiring the complainants to prove that they did not welcome the
challenged conduct, the Court should presume that the conduct
was unwelcome. If the defendant claims that the harassing conduct
was welcome, then a court should require the defendant to prove
by objective evidence, as part of an affirmative defense, that the
plaintiff, by affirmative acts, clearly consented to or solicited the
challenged conduct or that the plaintiffs affirmative acts objec-
tively justified the perpetrator's conclusion that the plaintiff
welcomed his advances. Silence, a polite "no," or evasive behavior
would not be considered an affirmative act objectively indicating
consent to sexual advances. Clear, affirmative consent from the
object of advances would be required. The defendant would not
be able to assume that his conduct was welcome, and he would not
be privileged to ignore a woman's words.
Second, to curb the defendant's ability to use the current legal
framework to prove that the challenged conduct was unwelcome to
attack, embarrass, or stigmatize the plaintiff, the legal framework
should be reformed in two other ways, one substantive and one
procedural. Substantively, courts should more narrowly define
what is "relevant" evidence pursuant to Rules 401 and 402 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Courts should redefine relevance to in-
clude evidence that is narrowly tailored to the specific purpose for
which it was proposed. Evidence of the plaintiff's sexual conduct
would be relevant if it involved the challenged conduct and the
alleged harasser, but only if the evidence was linked temporally to
the challenged conduct and was reciprocal in kind and degree.
Evidence of a previous but presently non-existing relationship be-
tween the parties would not be considered temporally relevant,
nor would insignificant conduct on the plaintiffs part if the de-
fendant's response was much more substantial. Evidence of sexual
conduct with third parties at work would not be admissible unless
it involved the harasser's sexual conduct toward other employees
and that conduct corroborated the plaintiffs claim. Evidence of
SUMMER 2001 ]
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sexual conduct between the plaintiff and the harasser outside of
work would be relevant, but evidence of sexual conduct on the
part of either party outside of the work environment that was unre-
lated to the challenged conduct would not be. If evidence tending
to embarrass, shame, or invade the plaintiff's privacy would be
technically admissible pursuant to Rules 403 and 404, then courts
should use Rule 412 to exclude such evidence.
Procedurally, courts should diligently apply the protections pro-
vided by the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Courts, without exception, should make admissibility de-
terminations in camera when the proffered evidence tends to
embarrass, stereotype, or invade the plaintiffs privacy. Courts
should require that all motions related to those admissibility de-
terminations be filed under seal and that the motions describe the
evidence to be admitted and its proffered purpose in great detail
so that the court may make an informed decision about the admis-
sibility of the evidence. Finally, courts should presumptively issue
confidentiality and protective orders barring discovery of evidence
that tends to embarrass, stereotype, or invade the plaintiffs privacy
unless the party seeking discovery can demonstrate that the evi-
dence is relevant and cannot be obtained in any other way.
These three reforms are consistent with the notion that Title VII
should be construed liberally and interpreted in a way that pre-
vents violations and broadens Title VII's humanitarian and
remedial purposes, 2' encouraging victims to prosecute sexual ha-
rassers, increasing the filing of legitimate sexual harassment claims
and, in turn, reducing workplace harassment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Its Prohibitions
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196422 prohibits sex discrimina-
tion by employers when making decisions involving employment. 23
21. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (citing with approval
the EEOC's regulations, 29 CFR § 1604.11(f)(1997), and the EEOC's policy statement,
EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 FEP Manual 405:6699 (Mar. 19, 1990)); id.
(recognizing the importance of implementing the policy underlying the enactment of Title
VII and of complementing the government's Title VII enforcement efforts); Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
22. See supra note 6.
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
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Title VII states that it is "an unlawful employment practice for an
employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of24 such individual's ... sex
25
."
2 6
There is a widely held belief that the prohibition against sex dis-
crimination "was offered as an addition to other proscriptions
[such as race, color, religion, or national origin] by opponents in a
last-minute attempt to block the bill which became the Act"27 and
"that the term sex was included in Title VII as a joke, by a fluke, or
in an attempt to overload the legislation."28 With the addition of
the term "sex," however, the bill passed quickly. 29 For an eight-year
period following the enactment of Title VII, there was no legisla-
tive history to clarify what Congress meant by including the term
"sex discrimination" or to contradict the belief that "sex" had been
included as a joke.0 Subsequent amendments to the Act, however,
31
affirm Congress's intent to combat sex discrimination. It is nowfirmly established that Title VII invalidates all "artificial, arbitrary
24. For a definition of "because of' in this context, see Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) ("In proving a claim for a hostile work environment due to
sexual harassment, therefore, a plaintiff must show that but for the fact of her sex, she
would not have been the object of harassment.") (citations omitted); Bundy v. Jackson, 641
F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[T]he question is one of but-for causation: would the
complaining employee have suffered the harassment had he or she been of a different gen-
der?"); Barnes v. Costie, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that sexual
harassment involves "the exaction of a condition which, but for his or her sex, the employee
would not have faced").
25. Title VII's prohibition of discrimination based on sex protects men and women,
regardless of whether the person is heterosexual, homosexual, or transsexual, because gen-
der and sexual orientation are not relevant to the inquiry of whether discrimination was sex
based. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (holding that
"nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of... sex' merely
because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged with acting on behalf of the
defendant) are of the same sex"); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463-64
(9th Cir. 1994) (noting that both men and women may have a viable sex discrimination
claim against the same harasser, regardless of gender); Miles v. N.Y. Univ., 979 F Supp. 248,
249-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that sex-based harassment of a transsexual is actionable
under Title VII because it is discrimination based on sex, male or female).
26, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (1994).
27. Barnes, 561 E2d at 987 (citing the remarks of Rep. Smith and Rep. Green that are
found at 110 CONG. REc. 2,577-82 (1964)).
28. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 288 n.105.
29. See Barnes, 561 E2d at 987 (citing 110 CONG. REc. 2,804-05, 14,511, 15,897
(1964)).
30. See id.
31. See id. (noting that when "the 1964 Act was amended by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 ... it became clear that Congress was deeply concerned about
employment discrimination founded on gender and intended to combat it as vigorously as
any other type of forbidden discrimination").
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and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers oper-
ate invidiously to discriminate on the bases of... impermissible
classification [s]" such as sex. One sex may not be exposed to dis-
advantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
members of the opposite sex are not exposed.3 These protections,
however, are limited. Title VII only prohibits unwelcome sexual
conduct in the workplace; it does not "prohibit all verbal or physi-
cal harassment."3 4 It allows for "genuine but innocuous differences
in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of
32. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 987 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 E2d 897,
901 (lth Cir. 1982) ("Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of gen-
der, and seeks to remove arbitrary barriers to sexual equality at the workplace.... .") (citing
Gri gs, 401 U.S. at 431). See also MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 288-89 n.105 (noting, first,
that since the original enactment, courts have taken Congress at its word: sex discrimination
is prohibited; second, that Title VII's legislative history and amendments make it apparent
that the addition of "sex" to Title VII was not a joke; and third, that Congress has had nu-
merous opportunities to eliminate the term "sex" from the Act but instead has chosen to
strengthen and extend its provisions in this regard); Bessie Margolin, Associate General
Counsel for the Department of Labor, Equal Pay and Equal Opportunities for Women,
Remarks at the 19th Conference on Labor at N.Y.U. (1967), in MAcKINNON, supra note 3, at
297, 301,306:
The most illuminating measure of the significance of both the Equal Pay Act and the
.sex" amendment requires particular emphasis because the mistaken idea has been circulat-
ing that, in contrast to race, color and creed discrimination, there is little or no legislative
history or documentation bearing on the legislative intent or objectives of the "sex"
amendment to Title VII. Anyone who asserts that the case against sex discrimination has not
been documented prior to the inclusion of sex discrimination in Title VII, or that "the legis-
lative history was virtually blank" and "the intent and reach of the amendment were
shrouded in doubt" has manifestly overlooked the overwhelmingly impressive documenta-
tion presented at the hearings on the Equal Pay bills.... The chronology of the enactment
of the Equal Pay Act and the Civil Rights Act, and the extensively documented facts and
statistics emphasized at the hearings and in the debates on the Equal Pay bills can leave no
doubt, I submit, of the direct relevance of this legislative history of the "sex" amendment of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.... It seems fair to say, therefore, that only ignorance or
thoughtless oversight of the pertinent legislative background, if not simply "entrenched
prejudice" rooted in a psychological downgrading of women generally, can explain the view
that the inclusion of sex discrimination in Title VII was no more than a "fluke" not to be
taken seriously .... Commissioner Graham in his speech to the Personnel Conference of
the American Management Association of February 9, 1966, specifically denounced the
"fluke" charge and warned against the negative approach implicit in that characterization.
He also made clear that the Commission is quite aware of the impressive legislative back-
ground underlying the Equal Pay Act and its manifest pertinence to the "sex" amendment
of Title VII.
33. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
34. Id.; see also LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 10, at 135 ("[I]t is essential to distin-
gnish welcome from unwelcome conduct, because consensual sexual relationships do not
violate Title VII.") (citing Walker v. Sullair Corp., 736 E Supp. 94, 99 (W.D.N.C. 1990) as
support for the proposition that a consensual sexual relationship will not give rise to a sex
discrimination claim).
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the same sex and of the opposite sex," 5 for "the ordinary tribula-
tions of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive
language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing, "36 and for
"offhand comments, and isolated incidents., 37 Title VII requires
"neither asexuality nor androgyny."38 To be actionable, conduct
must be "extreme, 39 and "objectively offensive."40 Title VII's stan-
dards are sufficiently demanding to insure that Title VII does not
become a general civility code41 and to ensure that courts and ju-
ries do not mistake innocent socializing such as horseplay or
sexual flirtation with discriminatory conditions of employment.
42
Title VII prohibits sex discrimination, and coupled with the con-
cept of sexual harassment, it is "designed to protect working
women from the kind of male attentions that can make the work-
place hellish ....
1. Sexual Harassment Prohibited as a Form of Sex Discrimination-
To accomplish Title VII's purpose, Congress created the EEOC,44
an independent administrative agency charged with enforcing Ti-
tle VII's prohibitions by investigating charges of unlawful
employment practices and attempting conciliation of meritorious
charges. 5 As part of its responsibility, the EEOC promulgates its
own regulations46 and publishes them in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions (CFR).7
The EEOC has stated that sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination. It recognizes two forms of sexual harassment
claims: quid pro quo and hostile environment. Section 1604.11 (a)
of the CFR defines quid pro quo harassment as follows:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute
35. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
36. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
37. Id.
38. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
39. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
40. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
41. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
42. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
43. Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 E3d 428, 430 (1995).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994).
45. See id. §§ 2000e-4, 5.
46. See id. § 2000e-12.
47. E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1998).
48. See id. § 1604.11 (a) ("Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Ti-
tie VII.").
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sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual's employment, [and when] (2) submission to or re-
jection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis
for employment decisions affecting such individual.49
Section 1604.11(a) of the CFR defines hostile environment har-
assment as follows:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute
sexual harassment ... [when] such conduct has the purpose
or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.
50
The courts are not bound by the EEOC regulations,5' but the
Supreme Court has suggested that the agency be given substantial
deference in sexual harassment cases.52 The first Supreme Court
case to recognize sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimina-
tion pursuant to Title VII was Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.55 In
Vinson, the Court adopted the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII
54
and recognized the two forms of sexual harassment:5  quid pro
quo 56 and hostile environment. 5 The terms "'quid pro quo' and
'hostile work environment' do not appear in the statutory text" of
Title VII nor in the text of the CFR.55 These terms first appeared in
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
52. See id. (noting that "while [the EEOC's regulations are] not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, [they] do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance") (quoting Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)).
53. See id. at 73.
54. See id. at 66.
55. See id. at 65-66.
56. For a discussion regarding a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, see discussion
infra Part I.B. 1.
57. For a discussion regarding a hostile environment sexual harassment claim, see dis-
cussion infra Part I.B.2.
58. See id. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998).
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academic literature,59 then in courts of appeals decisions and fi-
nally in United States Supreme Court decisions.61
B. Title VII's Two Sexual Harassment Claims
The two sexual harassment claims recognized by the Court pur-
suant to Title VII, quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual
harassment, will be discussed in turn.
1. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment-Quid pro quo literally
means the exchange of "something for something."62 The Court
has defined a quid pro quo claim as one in which an employer
demands the exchange of sexual favors from an employee in re-
turn forjob benefits.6
3
To maintain a Tide VII claim based on quid pro quo sexual har-
assment, the complainant must prove the following by a
preponderance of the evidence:
1. the plaintiff was a member of a protected class;6
2. the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome 65 sexual har-
assment in the form of sexual advances or sexual
favors;
3. the harassment complained of was based on sex;
6 6
4. the plaintiff's reaction to the harassment affected
tangible aspects of the terms and conditions of the
59. See id. (citing MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 32-47).
60. See id. (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 E2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982) as an
example). See also Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F2d 934, 943-47 (D.C. App. 1981) (recognizing
that a violation of Title VII may be predicated on harassment that involves the conditioning
of concrete employment benefits on sexual favors, and harassment that, while not affecting
economic benefits, creates a hostile or offensive working environment).
61. See id. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998) (citing Vinson as
an example and generally referring to E. Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual
Harassment, 21 HARV.J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 307 (1998)).
62. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 532 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
63. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 752.
64. This requirement is satisfied if there is a stipulation between the parties that the
complainant is either a woman or a man. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903; Trotta v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 788 F. Supp. 1336, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155,
162 (Mich. 1993) (noting that "all employees are inherently members of a protected class in
hostile work environment cases because all persons may be discriminated against on the
basis of sex").
65. See discussion infra Parts II. A-B.
66. See supra note 25.
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plaintiff's employment, with the plaintiff's accep-
tance or rejection of the harassment being either
an express or implied condition to receipt of a
benefit or the cause of a tangible adverse effect 8 on
the terms or conditions of the plaintiff's employ-
ment; and
5. the employer69 has responsibility7 ' for the acts of
sexual harassment in the workplace 71 to which the
plaintiff was subjected 2
In order to state a claim of quid pro quo harassment, the com-
plainant must prove that the harasser is "a supervisor with
immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee" 73
and that the demands made by the harasser were an express or
implied condition of employment.4 An express condition may be
as direct as the harasser saying, "I will fire you unless you sleep with
me."75 An implicit condition may be as subtle as the harasser
broaching the subject of sexual favors while discussing actual orS 76
potential job benefits or detriments. The closer the nexus be-tween the discussion about job benefits and the sexual advance,
67. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
69. Title VII applies to employers. See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 E3d 1295, 1314-15
(2d Cir. 1995) (finding that individual defendants with supervisory control over a plaintiff
may not be held personally liable under Title VII). See also Gary v. Long, 59 E3d 1391, 1397-
99 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Title VII defines an "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such a per-
son." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
70. In order for the employer to be held liable, the employer must have placed the
harasser in a position of authority over the employee. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). Em-
ployer liability is guided, but not completely governed, by common law agency principles.
See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (holding that traditional agency
principles are relevant for determining employer liability but cautioning that common law
agency principles might not be transferred in all particulars). For a more detailed explana-
tion of the application of common law agency principles pursuant to Title VII, see
Burlington, 524 U.S. at 754-65, and Faragher, 524 U.S. at 785-808.
71. An employer can be held vicariously liable for quid pro quo harassment. See Bur-
lington, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08 (both holding that "[a]n employer is
subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee ... when the supervisor's harassment
culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable
reassignment").
72. 5 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Instruction 88-
45A, at 88-237 (1999) (citing cases generally).
73. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
74. See Nichols, 42 E3d at 513.
75. Id. at 512.
76. See id. at 513.
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the more likely the case involves actionable quid pro quo harass-
ment.
77
The complainant must also prove that the acceptance or rejec-
tion of the unwelcome sexual conduct resulted in tangible and
detrimental employment action. 8 This would include "a significant
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities,
or a decision causing a significant change in benefits., 79 In most
cases, a tangible employment action inflicts direct economic harm
and requires an official act that in most cases is documented in
official company records and may be subject to review by higher
level supervisors. Unfulfilled threats"' of job-related harm or
benefits for sexual favors without some causally related, tangible
job detriment' do not constitute quid pro quo harassment.s The
77. See id. ("[W]e conclude that a supervisor's intertwining of a request for the per-
formance of sexual favors with a discussion of actual or potential job benefits or detriments
in a single conversation constitutes quid pro quo sexual harassment.")
78. See Burlington, 524 U.S. at 753-54.
79. Id. at 761.
80. See id. at 762.
81. Threats must be fulfilled to be actionable as quid pro quo harassment. See Burling-
ton, 524 U.S. at 753-54; Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 49 E3d 466, 474 (8th Cir. 1995)
(noting that plaintiff's subjective belief that defendant had threatened job retaliation did
not state a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1396 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (finding a supervisor's mere threat or promise ofjob-related harm or benefits is
insufficient to constitute quid pro quo harassment).
82. The tangible employment action must be detrimental. See Burlington, 524 U.S. at
761-62; Bryson v. Chi. State Univ., 96 E3d 912, 916 (7th Cir. 1996) (requiring "a materially
adverse employment action"); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (requiring
"adverse job consequences"); Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d
Cir. 1989) (noting that "[t]he gravamen of a quid pro quo claim is that a tangible job bene-
fit or privilege is conditioned on an employee's submission to sexual blackmail and that
adverse consequences follow from the employee's refusal"); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833
E2d 1406, 1414 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting that a plaintiff who sues under a quid pro quo
claim must establish that "tangible job benefits are conditioned on an employee's submis-
sion to conduct of a sexual nature and that adverse job consequences result from the
employee's refusal to submit to the conduct"); Highlander v. K.C. Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 805
F.2d 644, 649 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding no cause of action for quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment where "the record [is) totally devoid of any evidence tending to demonstrate that
plaintiff was denied a job benefit or suffered a job detriment as a result of her failure to
engage in the activity suggested by [defendant]");Jones v. Clinton, 990 E Supp. 657, 669-
71, 673 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (noting that a tangible job detriment is an essential element of a
quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, and that the plaintiff must demonstrate some nega-
tive change in employment status in form or substance such as a reduction in pay or
benefits or a negative change in job classification or title; that minor changes in duties or
working conditions with no materially significant disadvantage are insufficient to establish
the adverse conduct required to make a prima facie case because otherwise every trivial
personnel action that an irritable employee resented would form the basis of a discrimina-
tion suit) (citing cases from almost every circuit for support).
83. See Burlington, 524 U.S. at 753-54.
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complainant must pursue those claims under the theory of hostile
work environment sexual harassment.8
4
2. Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment-The second sexual
harassment claim recognized by the Court pursuant to Title VII is
hostile environment sexual harassment. The complainant in a hos-
tile environment case need not show that the acceptance or
rejection of the harassment was an express or implied condition to
receipt of a benefit or the cause of a tangible adverse effect on the
terms of employment. 85 To maintain a Title VII claim based on hos-
tile work environment sexual harassment, the complainant must
prove the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. the plaintiff was a member of a protected class;
86
2. the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome87 sexual har-
assment in the form of sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors or other verbal or physical conduct of
a sexual nature;
3. the harassment complained of was based on sex;88
4. the charged sexual harassment had the effect of un-
reasonably interfering with plaintiffs work
84. See id. at 754 (noting that claims involving unfulfilled threats should be catego-
rized as hostile work environment claims); J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment
Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 273, 280 n.15 (1995) (A quid pro quo claim "requires that
the victim either actually refuse the advances and suffer tangible job detriment or submit
and retain a tangible job benefit. Quid pro quo theory appears not to encompass cases in
which the supervisor threatens ajob detriment but fails to carry through on this threat after
the victim refuses to submit. There is thus no doctrine of attempted quid pro quo harass-
ment; such unwelcome advances could only be challenged under the hostile work
environment theory.") (citation omitted). See infra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of hostile work
environment claims.
85. Evidence of tangible adverse employment action, however, may affect employer liabil-
ity. See Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08
(1998), both holding as follows:
[a]n employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an action-
able hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively
higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken,
a defendant employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, sub-
ject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence .... The defense comprises two
necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer to avoid harm otherwise.... No affirmative defense is
available, however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible em-
ployment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.
86. See supra note 64.
87. See supra note 65.
88. See supra note 25.
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performance and creating an intimidating, hostile
or offensive work environment;89 and
5. the employer 9° has responsibility' for the acts of
sexual harassment in the workplace 92 to which the
plaintiff was subjected. 9
3
To be actionable under a hostile environment theory, the sexual
harassment must be so severe or pervasive 94 as "'to alter the condi-
tions of [the complainant's] employment and create an abusive
working environment.' ,,9 To determine whether the challenged
sexual conduct is sufficiently severe and pervasive to create a hos-
tile or offensive work environment, the court will look at "the
totality of the circumstances," 96 "including the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct;97 its severity;8 whether it is physically
89. See Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a)(3)(1985)); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 E2d 1311,1315 (lth Cir.
1989); Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1413; Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982).
90. See supra note 69.
91. See supra note 70.
92. See supra note 71.
93. 5 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERALJURY INSTRUCTIONS, Instruction 88-
45, at 88-233-88-34 (1999) (citing cases generally).
94. Note that it is the harassment, not the alteration of the conditions of employment,
which must be severe or pervasive. See Muench v. Township of Haddon, 255 N.J. Super. 288,
288 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); see also infra note 102 and accompanying text.
95. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786 (quoting Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d
at 904)) (bracketed words in original); Ellison v. Brady, 924 E2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991)
(citations omitted); Reed v. Shephard, 939 F.2d 484, 491 (7th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted);
Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1413 (citations omitted).
96. Hicks, 833 E2d at 1413 (citing Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 and 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b)
(1986)).
97. Compare Lam v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 122 F.3d 654, 656-57 (8th Cir. 1997)
(noting that a single exposure to a distasteful videotape was not enough to create a hostile
environment); Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1365-66 (10th Cir. 1997)
(noting that five sexually-oriented incidents spread out over the course of 16 months were
not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile environment); Rennie v. Dalton, 3 F.3d
1100, 1103, 1106-07 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that one off-color joke and a conversation
about a strip bar not directed personally at the employee did not sustain a cause of action);
Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 533-34 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that two inci-
dents of misconduct by a supervisor, each involving several remarks and impermissible
touching, were insufficient to sustain liability), and Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d
333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that several incidents of unwanted touching, attempts to
kiss, placing "I love you" signs in the work area, and asking the worker for dates did not
amount to a hostile work environment), with Downes v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 775 E2d 288,
294 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting that only conduct that is "routine" and that "becomes a 'condi-
tion' of anyone's employment" is actionable) (citations omitted).
98. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (finding that a workplace permeated with "discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult" is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment
conditions and create a hostile environment) (citing Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65); Carr v. Allison
Gas Turbine Div., GMC, 32 E3d 1007, 1010-11 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that there are gradations
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threatening or humiliating,9 or [whether it is] mere [ly an] offen-
sive utterance;100 and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance.""' The challenged conduct need
not impair the employee's productivity or work performance; the
plaintiff need only prove that the challenged conduct discrimina-
torily altered working conditions by creating an abusive working
environment. 2 In addition, to be actionable under the statute, "a
sexually objectionable environment must be both objectively and
subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive, and one that the victim [or employee] in fact
of shop talk and finding that targeting a female tinsmith directly, defacing her property, and
mutilating her clothes crossed the line from being merely vulgar and mildly offensive to
being deeply offensive and sexually harassing where the plaintiff was one woman among
many men and where her use of vulgar terms could not be deeply threatening, nor her
placing a hand on the thigh of one of her co-workers intimidating); Kotcher v. Rosa & Sulli-
van Appliance Ctr, Inc., 957 E2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that "[t]he incidents must be
repeated and continuous" to be severe and pervasive) (citations omitted); Carrero v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 577 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The incidents must be ... suffi-
ciently continuous and concerted in order to be deemed pervasive."); Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 E2d 897, 899 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding a hostile environment where the em-
ployer had subjected the plaintiff "to numerous haranguesof demeaning sexual inquiries
and vulgarities ... [and] repeatedly requested that she have sexual relations with him");
Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 883 (D. Minn. 1993) (finding that the
harasser had used language and epithets in an "intensely degrading" manner and that the
words used derived "their power to wound not only from their meaning but also for 'the
disgust and violence they express phonetically'") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Katz v. Dole, 709 E2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983) (quoting C. MILLER & K. Swn'r, WORDS AND
WOMEN 109 (1977)); Cuesta v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 805 F Supp. 451, 457 (W.D.
Tex. 1991) (noting that the employer's conduct went "beyond inoffensive, friendly ex-
changes" and was "clearly beyond what is socially acceptable for a supervisor" where he used
vulgar language to ask whether the plaintiff preferred vaginal or anal sex and continued to
ask her to have an affair with him, despite her clear intentions to remain faithful to her
husband).
99. See King v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 E2d 533, 534-35, 538 (7th Cir.
1993) (finding repeated verbal assaults and physical harassment actionable); Crisonino v.
New York City Hous. Auth., 985 R Supp. 385, 389-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding a supervisor's
comment that the plaintiff was a "dumb bitch" and the fact that he "touched her 'above the
breast' when he pushed her" were actionable).
100. A "mere utterance ... which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" does
not give rise to a Title VII claim because it would not sufficiently affect the terms and condi-
tions of the employee's employment. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (citing Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67);
Henson, 682 E2d at 904.
101. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-88 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
102. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that "the test is not
whether work has been impaired, but whether working conditions have been discriminato-
rily altered") (emphasis added); id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that "... 'the plaintiff
need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harass-
ment.' It suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct
would find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered working conditions as to
'ma[k]e it more difficult to do the job.'") (citing Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d
345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988)).
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perceived to be so." °3 Case law suggests that the objective severity
of harassment "should be judged from the perspective of a reason-
able person in the employee's position, considering 'all the
circumstances'... [including] careful consideration of the social
context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by
its target.' '0 4 To show that she subjectively perceived her working
103. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22).
104. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (citation omit-
ted). Commentators and the courts disagree as to whether the traditional objective
reasonable person standard or a more contextualized objective standard such as that of the
reasonable woman or the reasonable victim better serves the purposes of Title VII. Al-
though the Court has discussed the issue in dicta, the issue has not been explicitly decided.
For cases suggesting that Harris did not explicitly address the reasonableness standard
because it was dictum and not necessary for the holding, see, for example, Torres v. Pisano,
116 F.3d 625, 632 n.6 (2d Cir. 1997)("[G]iven that the Supreme Court refused to consider
the [reasonableness] issue in Harris, we do not see how that decision can be taken to have
foreclosed the use of a more contextualized objective standard.") (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at
22-23 (noting that the Court need not address the EEOC's proposed harassment regula-
tions, which require a more contextualized objective standard)) (citing 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266,
51,269 (1993) (proposed 29 C.F.R. § 1609.1(c)) ("The 'reasonable person' standard in-
cludes consideration of the perspective of persons of the alleged victim's race, color,
religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability."); Crowe v. Wiltel Communications Sys.,
103 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that there is no conflict between a standard
that takes into account "the perspective of a reasonable person ... with the same fundamental
characteristics as the plaintiff and the Supreme Court's decision in Harris) (emphasis added);
Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 540 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[The court must
consider not only the actual effect of the harassment on the plaintiff, but also the effect
such conduct would have on a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position.") (emphasis
added); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Whether a workplace
should be viewed as hostile or abusive-from both a reasonable person's standpoint as well
as the victim's subjective perception-can only be determined by considering the totality of
the circumstances."); Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 E3d 1126, 1131 (4th Cir.
1995); Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir. 1995); Dey v. Colt Constr.
& Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Harris but noting that the court must
look to the reasonable person in the plaintiffs position) (emphasis added) (citing Saxton v.
AT&T, 10 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 1993)); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1271-
72 (7th Cir. 1991).
For commentary regarding the same, see Juliano & Schwab, supra note 10, at 22, n.51
(citing Sarah E. Bums, Evidence of a Sexually Hostile Workplace: What Is It and How Should It Be
Assessed After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.?, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357, 360
(1994-95) (suggesting that Harris resolves only the question of proof of psychological injury
and doesn't address the reasonableness standard)); Laura Hoffman Roppe, Case Note,
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: Victory orDefeat?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 321, 336 (1995) (pro-
posing that the discussion of the reasonable person in Harris should not be read to do away
with the reasonable woman standard); Susan Collins, Note, Harris v. Forklift Systems: A
Modest Clarification of the Inquiry in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases, 1994 Wis. L.
REv. 1515, 154-48 (1994) (noting that Harris clarified the issue of psychological injury but
not the issues surrounding the reasonable woman test).
For cases supporting the use of the traditional objective reasonable person standard, see,
for example, Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Harris and
applying the objective reasonable person standard); Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1356
& n.22 (11th Cir. 1997)(same); Gillming v. Simmons Indus., 91 F.3d 1168, 1172 (8th Cir.
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1996) (noting that although the court had previously adopted the reasonable woman stan-
dard, "[g]iven the Supreme Court's use of the 'reasonable person' standard [in Harris], we
cannot find that the district court abused its discretion in using th[e objective reasonable
person] standard in its jury instruction"); DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n,
51 E3d 591, 594 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The test is an objective one, not a standard of offense to a
,reasonable woman.'"); Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 E3d 439, 444 (7th Cir. 1994)
(applying the reasonable person standard); King v. Hillen, 21 E3d 1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (same).
For commentary arguing that the traditional objective reasonable person standard is best
because the reasonable woman standard is contrary to equality principles, ambiguous, and
unfair to men, see Juliano & Schwab, supra note 10, at 24 n.57 (citing Paul B.Johnson, The
Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law: Progress or Illusion?, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
619, 621 (1993)) ("[C]ourts that have embraced the new [reasonable woman] standard
have done so primarily as a declaration of political faith, not because the standard was of
any real value in deciding the case."); Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, The Legal, Ethical,
and Social Implications of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61
FORDHAm L. REv. 773 (1993) (arguing that it is unfair to hold men to a standard that, be-
cause they are men, they may be unable to understand or appreciate fully); Kathleen A.
Kenealy, Sexual Harassment and the Reasonable Woman Standard, 8 LAB. L.J. 203 (Spring 1992)
(suggesting that the reasonable woman standard sends a message that women are inher-
ently unreasonable and the standard is a legal setback for women); Walter Christopher
Arbery, Note, A Step Backwards for Equality Principles: The "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Title
VII Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims, 27 GA. L. REv. 503 (1993) (rejecting
the reasonable woman standard because it abandons the ideal of shared values between
men and women).
For cases supporting a more contextualized standard, see, for example, Torres v. Pisano,
116 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 1997) (using the "reasonable woman" standard and citing sup-
port for a more contextualized reasonable woman or reasonable employee in the
[plaintiff's] shoes standard); Newton v. Dep't of the Air Force, 85 E3d 595, 599 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (citing and parenthetically quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991)
("Well-intentioned compliments by co-workers or supervisors can form the basis of a sexual
harassment cause of action if a reasonable victim of the same sex as the plaintiff would con-
sider the comments sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a condition of employment and
create an abusive working environment.")); Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 E3d 1522, 1527
(9th Cir. 1995) ("Whether the workplace is objectively hostile must be determined from the
perspective of a reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics."); West v.
Phila. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 753 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that a relevant question is whether
"the discrimination would have detrimentally affected a reasonable person of the same
protected class in that position"); Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1456 (7th Cir.
1994) ("[Tlhe incident on the elevator ... would no doubt be even more frightening to a
reasonable woman in [the plaintiff's] position who, prior to that incident, had endured
more than two years of verbal harassment."); Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959,
962 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[I]n hostile environment litigation under Title VII, the appropri-
ate standard is that of a reasonable woman under similar circumstances."); Yates v. Avco
Corp., 819 E2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) ("In a sexual harassment case involving a male su-
pervisor's harassment of a female subordinate, it seems only reasonable that the person
standing in the shoes of the employee should be 'the reasonable woman' since the plaintiff
in this type of case is required to be a member of a protected class and is by definition fe-
male.").
For commentary urging the adoption of a more contextualized reasonable victim or rea-
sonable woman standard, seeJuliano & Schwab, supra note 10, at 23 n.56 (citing Gillian K.
Hadfield, Rational Woman: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1151 (1995) (ad-
vocating the use of a "rational woman" standard)); Sarah A. DeCosse, Simply Unbelievable:
Reasonable Women and Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 10 LAw & INEQ. 285 (1992)
(arguing that the reasonable woman standard challenges stereotyped roles and permits a
[VOL. 34:4
SUMMER 2001] Title VII Quid Pro Quo
conditions as hostile or abusive, the complainant must show that
the environment adversely affected her.'0° If the conduct is objec-
tively perceived as severe and pervasive, and the complainant
presents evidence that she subjectively perceived it as such, there is
no need to demonstrate psychological injury.10 6 The effect on the
complainant's psychological well being would only be "relevant to
determining whether the plaintiff [subjectively] found the envi-
ronment abusive.',
0 7
If the complainant proves all of the elements of either a quid
pro quo or a hostile environment claim, the complainant has es-
tablished a violation of Title VII's prohibition against sex
discrimination. This Note focuses on one element shared by both
claims. In order to maintain either claim, the complainant must
prove that the challenged conduct was unwelcome.
broader scope of actionable claims); Kim L. Kirn, The "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual
Harassment Cases, 81 ILL. B.J. 404 (1993) (encouraging the adoption of the reasonable
woman test); RobertJ. Shoop, The Reasonable Woman in a Hostile Work Environment, 72 EDuc.
L. REP. 703 (1992) (arguing that the reasonable woman standard makes the legal system
more responsive to women); Angela Baker, Comment, Employment Law--The "Reasonable
Woman" Standard under Ellison v. Brady: Implications for Assessing the Severity of Sexual Harass-
ment and the Adequacy of Employer Response, 17 J. CORP. L. 691 (1992) (noting that Ellison
advocated that the reasonable woman standard allows courts to examine the differences in
the societal power of men and women); Deborah S. Brenneman, Comment, From a Woman's
Point of View: The Use of the Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases 60 U. CiN.
L. REv. 1281 (1992) (advocating the reasonable woman standard because it neutralizes the
divergent perceptions between men and women of what constitutes appropriate sexual
behavior); Cheryl L. Dragel, Note and Comment, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment:
Should the Ninth Circuit's "Reasonable Woman" Standard Be Adopted?, 11 J.L. & CoM. 237 (1992)
(arguing that the reasonable woman standard appears to ease burdens on female plaintiffs
seeking to establish hostile environment claims); Deborah B. Goldberg, Note, The Road to
Equality: The Application of the Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 2 CAR-
DOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 195 (1995) (advocating adoption of the reasonable woman standard
and arguing that the traditional reasonable person standard hurts women), and also Jane L.
Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and the Shaping of Legal Stan-
dards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151 (1994) (criticizing both the objective reasonable person and the
reasonable woman standard and urging the adoption of the contextualized reasonable
victim standard because it is gender-neutral and allows recognition of a male-dominated
workplace that exists in a society that subordinates women while screening out frivolous
claims from hypersensitive plaintiffs).
105. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22 ("[I]f the victim does not subjectively perceive the en-
vironment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim's
employment, and there is no Title VII violation.").
106. See id. at 23 ("The effect on the employee's psychological well-being is, of course,
relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But
while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no
single factor is required.").
107. Id.
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II. PROVING THAT THE CHALLENGED
CONDUCT WAS UNWELCOME
A. The Burden of Proof
Although the United States Supreme Court has not addressed
the issue directly, case law suggests that in order to maintain a Title
VII claim of sexual discrimination for either quid pro quo or hos-
tile environment harassment, the complainant must prove as part
of her prima facie case that her conduct indicated that she did not
welcome the challenged sexual conduct. 8 Case law suggests that
the complainant has the burden of proving that the challenged
conduct was unwelcome by a preponderance of the evidence.'
The "[p] reponderance of the evidence" means "the greater weight
of evidence," or "the evidence which, when weighed with that op-
posed to it, has more convincing force and is more probably true
and accurate.""0 Note that if the evidence is equally balanced or of
equal probative value, the complainant loses because the burden
of production and persuasion fall upon the plaintiff."' To meet her
burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she did not solicit or
incite the defendant's advances or that she found his advances un-
desirable or offensive. "
2
108. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (emphasizing that "[t]he
gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwel-
come'") (emphasis added); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1998) ("Unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute
sexual harassment.").
109. See Perkins v. General Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487, 1499 (W.D. Mo. 1989)
("Plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion as to each essential element of her claim; she
must establish the existence of each element by a preponderance of the credible evi-
dence."). See also Weiner, supra note 19, at 625 n.18 (noting Professor Radford's argument
that although the Court has not directly addressed the allocation of the burden of proof in
sexual harassment cases, its language in other cases has indicated that there is an "actual
affirmative requirement that the plaintiff prove at trial" that her conduct put her harasser
on notice that he was unwelcome, and noting the Professor's observation that the combina-
tion of the Vinson decision and the EEOC's guidelines has led to the general adoption of
this formulation of the plaintiff's burden) (citing Radford, infta note 139, at 510).
110. Perkins, 709 E Supp. at 1499 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
111. See Smith v. United States, 726 F.2d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1984).
112. See Burns v. McGregor Elec. Ind. Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting
that "[w]hether the behavior is unwelcome is to be determined by weighing whether the
conduct was uninvited and offensive"); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 E2d 897, 903 (11 th
Cir. 1982) (noting that the challenged conduct "must be unwelcome in the sense that the
employee did not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that the employee regarded the con-
duct as undesirable or offensive");Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 883 (D.
Minn. 1993) ("The threshold for determining that conduct is unwelcome is that the em-
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B. The Victim's Conduct as the Measure
In determining whether the plaintiff has met her burden of
proof, the court will examine "the plaintiff's words, deed, and de-
portment.""' 3 The court will look at "'the record as a whole' and
'the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual
advances and the context in which the alleged incidents oc-
curred.' ,,114 Specifically, the court will examine the following facts:
a) Whether plaintiff by her own conduct indicated
that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome.
b) Whether the plaintiff substantially contributed to
the alleged distasteful atmosphere by her own "pro-
fane and sexually suggestive conduct."
c) Whether the plaintiff in response to evidence that
at various times she had willingly participated in the
conduct now complained of can "identify with some
precision a point at which she made known to her
co-workers or superiors that such conduct would
[henceforth] be considered offensive."
d) Whether and, if so, when, plaintiff reported or
complained about any of the incidents at issue.
e) Whether plaintiff's account of the "unwelcome"
sexual conduct is sufficiently detailed and internally
consistent so as to be plausible. 5
Note that the focus of the unwelcomeness inquiry is on
"whether [the complainant] by her conduct indicated that the al-
leged sexual advances were unwelcome,"' 6 not on whether the
ployee did not solicit or incite it, and the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or
offensive.") (internal quotation and citations omitted).
113. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69, cited inJenson, 824 E Supp. at 883 ("Women's actions and
use of language is relevant evidence in determining whether women found particular con-
duct unwelcome.").
114. 29 C.ER. § 1604.11 (b) (2000). The courts are not bound by the EEOC regulations,
but the Supreme Court has suggested the administrative agency be given substantial defer-
ence in sexual harassment cases. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65 (noting that "while [the EEOC's
regulations are] not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, [they] do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance").
115. Perkins, 709 F Supp. at 1499 (internal citations omitted).
116. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68 (emphasis added).
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complainant had previously voluntarily engaged in sexual relations
with the defendant.117
On the one hand, voluntary participation in occasional sexual
banter, use of sexually explicit language, or sexual conduct by an
employee with co-workers will not preclude a sexual harassment
claim."" Willing participation in private and consensual sexual ac-
tivities does not constitute a waiver of legal protections against
unwelcome and unsolicited sexual harassment in the workplace.""
Voluntary participation in these kinds of suggestive activities will
not bar a claim if the employee can "show that at some point she
clearly made her co-workers and supervisors aware that in the fu-
ture such conduct would be considered 'unwelcome.' ,1
2 0
Complaining or reporting the offensive conduct can constitute
such notification. However, because the focus of the inquiry is on
whether the complainant's conduct indicated that the sexual ad-
vances were unwelcome, notification that the challenged conduct
was unwelcome need not be expressed verbally or by formal com-
plaint. An employee can effectively communicate unwelcomeness
117. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 60 (finding that the fact that the plaintiff had had sexual in-
tercourse with the defendant forty to fifty times did not preclude a sexual harassment
claim); Shrout v. Black Clawson Co., 689 E Supp. 774, 779-80 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding
that the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment regardless of having main-
tained a voluntary, consensual sexual relationship with the defendant for several years).
118. See Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 E2d 959, 963-64 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding
that the plaintiff's decision to pose nude for a national magazine outside of working hours
did not preclude a finding that she did not welcome sexual harassment at work); Swentek v.
USAIR Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[p]laintiff's use of foul language
and sexual innuendo in a consensual setting d[id] not waive her legal protections against
unwelcome harassment").
119. See Swentek, 830 F.2d at 557 (citing Katz v. Dole, 709 E2d 251, 254 n.3 (4th Cir.
1983) ("A person's private and consensual sexual activities do not constitute a waiver of his
or her legal protections against unwelcome and unsolicited sexual harassment.")).
120. Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1564 & n.12 (M.D. Fla.
1990) (holding that plaintiff's willing and frequent participation in the challenged conduct
coupled with her failure to "report [the conduct] to management until months later and
then only by an off-hand reference during informal conversation in a back stairwell with her
supervisor" precluded a finding that she had clearly indicated by her conduct that the ob-
jectionable actions were unwelcome), affd, 949 F.2d 1162 (lth Cir. 1991)). See also
Kennedy v. GN Danavox, 928 E Supp. 866, 871-72 (D. Minn. 1996) (holding there was no
evidence conduct was unwelcome where the plaintiff failed to verbally or nonverbally com-
municate his discomfort when his supervisor used the word "love" in a letter to him and
where she gave him expensive, personal gifts).
121. See Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., GM Corp., 32 E3d 1007, 1010-12 (7th Cir.
1994) (indicating conduct was unwelcome due to plaintiff's violent resentment of her co-
workers' conduct and although "[a]t first she disregarded the harassment," she eventually
complained repeatedly to her immediate supervisor and eventually resigned); Martin v. City
of Youngstown, No. 91-3335, 91-3336, 1992 WL 91977, at **3-4 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 1992) (find-
ing that the employee's report of harassing behavior to supervisor rebutted allegation that
she welcomed conduct despite the fact that she participated in similar activities).
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by withdrawing from physical contact and changing the subject of
a sexualized conversation, 22 by pushing the alleged harasser away
and leaving the room, 3 or by making diverting comments and sar-
castic remarks.1 21 Contemporaneous'25 protest in some form is
strongly advised because it may stop the harassment before it be-
comes more serious. Furthermore, it will provide objective
evidence that the sexual harassment actually occurred and demon-
strate the reasonableness of the employee's conduct in seeking to
avoid the harm, which may assist the victim should an employer
assert an affirmative defense to vicarious liability.2
6
Similarly, the complainant's voluntary contribution "to the sex-
ualization of the workplace" will not preclude a sexual harassment
122. See Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 784 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding that
employee effectively communicated unwelcomeness by withdrawing her hands when
cupped by the defendant's and changing the subject of an objectionable conversation; "evi-
dence that employee consistently demonstrated her unalterable resistance to all sexual
advances is enough to establish their unwelcomeness").
123. SeeJones v. Wesco Investments, Inc., 846 E2d 1154, 1155 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding
that pushing supervisor away, informing him she was uninterested, and leaving the room
was sufficient protest).
124. EEOC Dec. 84-1, 33 F.E.P. Cases 1887, 1888, 1890 (1983) (finding that diverting
comments, "tone of voice, disgusted looks, short, brief" and/or sarcastic remarks were suffi-
cient to indicate to the defendant that his conduct was unwelcome).
125. "For a complaint to be 'contemporaneous,' it should be made while the harass-
ment is ongoing or shortly after it has ceased." E.E.O.C. Policy Guidance on Sexual
Harassment, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:6685 n.7 (March 19, 1990).
126. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806-07 (1998) (holding that
there needs to be some objective proof that the conduct was undesirable or offensive; the
victim has an affirmative duty to use reasonable means under the circumstances to avoid an
ongoing violation); Hartsell v. Duplex Products, Inc., 123 E3d 766, 774 n.7 (4th Cir. 1997)
(noting that female sales assistant's failure to complain to her husband or to alleged harass-
ers about alleged sexual harassment until after confrontation weakened her claim that
harassment was unwelcome); Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 E Supp. 1559, 1564
(M.D. Fla. 1990) (finding that conduct was not "unwelcome" where the plaintiff did not
report offensive behavior until months after it happened and, even then, only in the course
of casual conversation with her supervisor), affd, 949 E2d 1162 (11th Cir. 1991); Spencer v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 697 F. Supp. 204, 210 (E.D. Va. 1988) (noting that the plaintiff's failure to
complain for more than two years was "particularly telling"); E.E.O.C. Policy Guidance, infra
note 142, at 7-8 (noting that "victims are well-advised to assert their right to a workplace
free from sexual harassment" because this "may stop the harassment before it becomes
more serious;" noting that a contemporaneous complaint is not a necessary element to a
sexual harassment claim, but it may provide "persuasive evidence that the sexual harass-
ment in fact occurred as alleged," particularly if "there is some indication of welcomeness
or if the credibility of the parties is at issue; and noting that if a complaint was not made,
"the investigation must ascertain why"); Jane E. Larson & Jonathan A. Knee, We Can Do
Something About Sexual Harassment, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1991, at A21 (noting "senators re-
peatedly cited Prof. Anita Hill's failure to file a sexual harassment complaint against
[Clarence Thomas] as a reason not to believe her"). See alsoJuliano & Schwab, supra note
10, at 29 (noting that plaintiffs who had not reported the sexual harassment to a supervisor
lost their cases in court 76.2% of the time).
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claim if the complainant's behavior is qualitatively different from
the challenged conduct. 27 A complainant's use of foul language
and sexual innuendo would not, in turn, welcome sexual graffiti,
photographs, cartoons, and coarse language reflecting an anti-
female attitude, nor would it welcome physical acts reflecting a
sexual motive, if she exhibited her disdain for such actions by re-
moving the pornographic pictures, erasing the graffiti,
complaining about the verbal comments, and telling her co-
workers that their actions were improper.28 Foul language and
sexual innuendo is different in kind and degree from sexually mo-
tivated physical acts, misogynistic language, and pornographic
pictures, and thus, the co-worker's response to the complainant's
conduct would not be considered reciprocal.
On the other hand, if the complainant participated in the chal-
lenged sexual conduct by significantly contributing to the offensive
environment or regularly instigating sexual conversations or activi-
ties with co-workers, the court may find, based on the totality of
the circumstances, that the challenged conduct was welcome.'2
Examples of voluntary sexual behavior which would preclude a
claim that challenged sexual conduct was unwelcome include
using offensive language while engaging in exhibitionist behav-
127. See LiNDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 10, at 50.
128. SeeJenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 883 (D. Minn. 1993) (finding
that the defendant's conduct was unwelcome because although the plaintiffs cursed and
used coarse language, their conduct was qualitatively different in kind and degree).
129. See Reed v. Shepard, 939 E2d 484, 486-88, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding plain-
tiff's admitted toleration of her atrocious work environment and her willing participation in
the crude shenanigans prevented her from claiming conduct reciprocated in kind was un-
welcome); Perkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. at 1497-98 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (holding
no hostile work environment where men in shop made catcalls, touched the plaintiffs
breasts, made comments about the plaintiffs genitals, placed a hot dog in a condom on the
plaintiff's desk, made "humping" and masturbation motions in front of the plaintiff, told
sexual jokes, shook their genitals at each other and used profanity, because the plaintiff
encouraged the conduct by using "shop talk," "goosing" men, referring to their genitals as
"pickles," and on the few occasions that she did complain, the conduct was dealt with ap-
propriately), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22 (8th Cir.
1990); Hicks v. Baltimore Gas, 829 F. Supp. 791, 796 (D. Md. 1992) (noting that plaintiff's
sexual harassment claim failed because she admitted calling co-workers names, subjecting
them to offensive language, and behaving erratically and angrily herself), affd, 998 E2d
1009 (4th Cir. 1993); Weinsheimer, 754 E Supp. at 1564 (finding that the "plaintiffs willing
and frequent involvement in the sexual innuendo prevalent in her work area indicate [d]
that she did not find the majority of such conduct truly 'unwelcome' or 'hostile"); McLean
v. Satellite Tech. Serv., Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1458, 1459-60 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (finding plaintiff's
"lusty libido" and failure of virtue indicated that the conduct would have been welcome);
Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meridian, 633 F. Supp. 1323, 1327 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (finding conduct
could not have been unwelcome because the "plaintiff often made jokes about sex and
participated in frequent discussions and bantering about sex") affJd, 924 F.2d 971 (5th Cir.
1987).
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ior, giving suggestive gifts, and engaging in sexual horseplay; 130
frequently "us[ing] crude and vulgar language," "initiat[ing]
sexually oriented conversations," asking male employees about
their marital and extramarital sexual relationships while "volun-
teer[ing] ... intimate details" about her own marital and
premarital sexual relationships;1 3 ' and participating in sexual
jokes coupled with the use of extremely vulgar language."' Notice
that the unwelcomeness inquiry is very fact specific and dependent
on the fact finder's evaluation of each individual case. Distinguish-
ing sexual conduct that is welcome from that which is unwelcome
is often difficult 3  because "the distinction between invited, unin-
vited-but-welcome, offensive-but-tolerated and flatly rejected"
sexual advances is often elusive.34 For this reason, the inquiry is
problematic, especially with regard to a sensitive issue such as sex-
ual norms.
C. The Problems
There are two problems with proving that the challenged con-
duct was unwelcome that unnecessarily discourage victims from
filing legitimate sexual harassment claims. The first problem is that
the legal framework used to prove that challenged conduct is un-
welcome unfairly places the burden of proving this element on the
victim. Instead of reducing sexual discrimination at work, it pro-
tects the undercurrent of sexuality in the workplace at the expense
of the emotional and bodily integrity of the female employee.3 5 It
preserves male access to "traditional" workplace sex "by the opera-
tion of sexism in the law.'
36
130. See Reed, 939 F.2d 484, 486-87, 491-92 (finding that the challenged conduct was
welcome and that the plaintiff had amazing resilience and relished reciprocating in kind).
131. Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639, 640 (E.D. Mo.
1982).
132. See Ramsdell v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, 615 N.E. 2d 192, 194 (Mass. 1993) (find-
ing that even though the environment was " 'rife with sexually explicit language and sexual
innuendos,'" the plaintiff's use of extremely vulgar language and her participation in sexual
jokes precluded a claim that the conduct was unwelcome).
133. SeeNichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510-11 (9th Cir. 1994).
134. Barnes v. Costle, 561 E2d 983,999 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (MacKinnon,J., concurring).
135. See Estrich, supra note 19, at 828.
136. Id. at 815 (noting that in everyday life the "male domain is protected by the wield-
ing of real power-economic, physical, psychological, and emotional" and that in law, "it is
protected by... manipulating [ ] doctrines to embrace female stereotypes... by the opera-
tion of sexism in law").
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Placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff allows the courts to
inject their own moral assessments of how women should or
should not behave13 into their legal judgments in a way that hurts
women because it focuses on the woman's conduct as seen from a
man's perspective. This makes litigation more difficult for victims,
aiding in the harassment and perpetuating some of the most per-
nicious and demeaning sexual stereotypes of women.
13
First, placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff rests on the
untenable presumption that most people welcome sexual advances
in the workplace. Some courts and commentators claim that sexual
interaction at work is socially useful and therefore should be
protected because it may be beneficial or at least nonoffensive. 139
They claim that sexual interaction at work is socially useful'
40
because an undercurrent of appropriate sexuality in the workplace
may stimulate people to work harder, to be kinder, to react
favorably, to develop emotional intimacy, and to lace conversations
with humor and good-natured teasing.1 4' The unwelcomeness
element of sexual harassment claims exists, they argue, to
distinguish this socially useful or nonoffensive conduct from
actionable sexual harassment.'
137. See Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 E2d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 1993) (overrul-
ing the district court's finding that a woman who had posed nude for a biker magazine
could not be offended by sexual advances at work and noting that the plaintiff's "private
life, regardless how reprehensible the trier of fact might find it to be, did not provide lawful
acquiescence to unwanted sexual advances at her workplace by her employer").
138. See Estrich, supra note 19, at 826.
139. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J., concur-
ring) (noting that "[s]exual advances may not be intrinsically offensive .... [because they
involve] social patterns that to some extent are normal and expectable" ); LINDEMANN &
KAOUE, supra note 10, at 135 (noting that "sexual advances often have social utility and of-
ten are not inherently offensive"); Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of
Welcomeness in Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REv. 499, 541 (1994) (noting that a sexual
undercurrent at work "may be beneficial or at least nonoffensive to many individuals of
both genders"). See also Estrich, supra note 19, at 828 (noting that it has been argued that
the notice requirement is imposed on the woman because men need "love," and arguing
that "at the very least... we might demand that such men look for love outside of work, or
at least ask for it first") (citations omitted).
140. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 10, at 135. See also Nichols, 42 F.3d 503, 510
("[Clourts are understandably reluctant to chill the incidence of legitimate romance. Peo-
ple who work closely together and share common interests often find that sexual attraction
ensues. It is not surprising that those feelings arise even when one of the persons is a supe-
rior and the other subordinate.... [We tend) to find our friends, lovers, and even our
mates in the workplace.... ."). But see Estrich, supra note 19, at 860 (asserting that the social
utility of consensual sexual conduct in the workplace does not outweigh the disadvantages).
141. See Radford, supra note 139, at 542.
142. See id. at 504 ("The stated rationale for the unwelcomeness element of the defini-
tion of sexual harassment is that it is difficult to distinguish harassing sexual conduct from
conduct that occurs simply because 'sexual attraction may often play a role in the day-to-day
social exchange between employees.'") (citing Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual
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The EEOC seems to agree. The EEOC has defined sexual har-
assment to include "unwelcome" sexual conduct.1 43 In conjunction
with its definition, the EEOC has "emphasized that '[s]exual at-
traction is a fact of life' that 'may often play a role in the day-to-day
social exchange between employees in the workplace,' ''44 "that
Title VII rules must be carefully crafted so as not to intrude on
'purely personal, social relationship [s],' ,145 and that "'[s]exual
harassment continues to be addressed in separate guidelines be-
cause it raises issues about human interaction that are to some
extent unique in comparison to other harassment and, thus, may
warrant separate emphasis.' ,146
The commentators note that the rationale for including the un-
welcomeness element of sexual harassment claims "resembles that
for including an 'offensiveness' element in the definition of bat-
tery." 4 7 To state a claim of battery, the plaintiff must prove that the
challenged contact was offensive because "in a crowded world, a
certain amount of personal contact is inevitable, and must be ac-
cepted."48 If physical contact is considered "normal" or "likely to
occur between people in day-to-day life," it is not actionable bat-
tery.149 Similarly, sexual contact in the workplace that is considered
"normal" or part of an employee's daily life is protected by the un-
welcomeness element of sexual harassment claims and is not
considered actionable sexual harassment.5
Many courts have accepted this rationale, although it fails to
recognize that "[w]hile physical contact may be inevitable and
normal in a crowded world, sexual advances in the workplace need
not be."' ' The fact that "offensive sexuality is so routinely considered
Harassment, E.E.O.C. Notice N-915-050, at 7 (March 19, 1990)) [hereinafter EEOC Policy
Guidance].
143. 29 C.ER. § 1604.11(a) (1998). See also supra notes 49, 50 and accompanying text.
144. Radford, supra note 139, at 509 (quoting Brief for the United States and Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae at E-6, Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986), reprinted in Daily Labor Report (BNA) No. 241, at E-1 (Dec. 16, 1985)
[hereinafter EEOC Brief]).
145. Radford, supra note 139, at 509 (quoting Preamble to Interim Guidelines on Sex
Discrimination, 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980)).
146. Radford, supra note 139, at n.187 (quoting the EEOC's proposed Guidelines on
Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age, or Disability, 58
Fed. Reg. 51,266, 51,267 (1993) (to be codified at 29 C.ER. § 1609) (proposed Oct. 1,
1993).
147. Id. at 504.
148. Radford, supra note 139, at 504 & n.18 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 42 (5th ed. 1984)).
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. Id. (emphasis added).
SUMMER 2001]
University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform
normal, abuse of power acceptable, and the dehumanizing of
women in sexual relations unremarkable,"'152 does not mean that it
should continue to be acceptable behavior, given that Title VII in-
validates all "artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate
on the bases of... impermissible classification [s]" such as sex.15 3
Tort law requires that a doctor secure affirmative, informed con-
sent before he touches a woman, but according to the current
legal framework, an employer need not seek a woman's consent;
he may legally touch any subordinate or co-worker until and unless
she expresses, through her conduct, non-assent.'54
Assuming that sexual conduct in the workplace is beneficial,
"normal," or likely perpetuates the myth that most people are not
offended by sexual attention. 155 Accepted sociological and psycho-
logical findings about women's attitudes toward sexual attention at
work, however, contradict this assumption. 156 Psychological and so-
ciological research indicates that most people would find sexual
attention at work humiliating, distracting, and potentially harmful
to their ability to perform theirjobs successfully. 151
152. Estrich, supra note 19, at 860.
153. Barnes v. Costle, 561 E2d 983, 987 (1977) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. See Estrich, supra note 19, at 828.
155. See Radford, supra note 139, at 505.
156. See id. at 505 & n.23; Id. at 522 & n.147 (noting studies that emphasize that the
majority of women do not like sexual encounters in the workplace).
157. See id. at 526. For psychological and sociological research supporting this asser-
tion, see id. at 520-24. Some commentators argue that the same is true of racial and ethnic
harassment. See id. at 526, 529. As with sexual harassment, racial and ethnic harassment is
humiliating, distracting, and potentially harmful to a person's ability to perform successfully
at work. See id. at 526. Yet in racial and ethnic harassment cases, the challenged conduct is
presumed unwelcome. See id. at n.187 (noting that "racial slurs are intrinsically offensive
and presumptively unwelcome") (citing EEOC Brief, supra note 144, at E-5). The courts in
racial and ethnic harassment cases focus on the severity and pervasiveness of the harasser's
conduct and not on whether the challenged conduct was unwelcomed. See id. at 526, 529
(citing for support Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 E2d 1264, 1274 (7th Cir. 1991) (exam-
ining the effect of a mention of the Ku Klux Klan on a black worker and noting that
"[p]lainly, any black would find this graffiti threatening")). Because the psychological and
sociological studies support the same presumption for both forms of harassment in the
workplace, commentators urge that sexual harassment cases be brought in line with racial
harassment cases. The author notes, however, that racial and gender classifications are
treated differently in other areas of the law. See, e.g., Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d
345,348 n.1 (6th Cir. 1988) (justifying a different treatment of racial harassment as opposed
to sexual harassment by pointing to the different level of constitutional scrutiny that is ap-
plied in race discrimination as opposed to sex discrimination cases). For example, a race-
based classification challenged pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution
will be examined as a suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny while a gender-based
classification will be examined as a quasi-suspect classification subject to intermediate scru-
tiny. Before coming to the conclusion that race and sexual harassment cases should be dealt
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Second, placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff focuses the
inquiry on the plaintiff and her conduct, not on the alleged perpe-
trator and the challenged conduct.'58 This implies that the victim is
somehow to blame for the harasser's conduct, that she must have
behaved, spoken, or dressed in a way that invited the harasser, that
she somehow "asked for it." It also defines the issue "more by the
actions, reactions, motives, and inadequacies of the victim than by
those of the defendant." 59 This places the focus on the "appropri-
ateness of the male-female relationship and [on] the woman's role
in provoking, accepting, endorsing, and affirming" the challenged
conduct. The victim, after being sexually harassed at work, must
then tolerate "the indignity of the Court's presumption that she is
to blame.""" This implied presumption overlooks the fact that the
harasser has free will and can choose to control his behavior. If an
employee behaves, speaks, or dresses unprofessionally, the issue
may be handled through the appropriate supervisory channels. It
should never legally justify sexual harassment.
Third, placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff predisposes
the court to disbelieve the plaintiff. It privileges the possibility that
she may be lying or filing a frivolous suit to get even because she is
vengeful or perhaps scorned.1 62 Evidence suggests, however, that
female employees rarely file frivolous or meritless sexual harass-
ment claims. 63 Psychological and sociological studies demonstrate
with identically, the history, the reasons, and the differences relating to the respective classi-
fications should be closely analyzed. The author has not addressed this issue because it is
beyond the scope of this Note.
158. See Estrich, supra note 19, at 828.
159. Id. at 815.
160. Id. at 814.
161. Id. at 829 ("Women are invisible as anything other than potential sexual objects of
men .... And in making the determination of the harassment of women dependent upon
the extent of 'sexually provocative' behavior by women, the Court adopts a rule which holds
women responsible for their own torment. Thus, the victim of harassment ... suffers not
only the direct injury of sexual abuse, but also the indignity of the Court's presumption that
she is to blame.").
162. See Radford, supra note 139, at 529 n.187 (noting "that the 'unwelcomeness test is
at root the product of an outdated stereotype' about women using legal action to abuse
lovers who have spurned them") (quoting Michael D. Vhay, The Harms of Asking- Towards a
Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 328, 344 (1988)). But see
Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1994) (expressing concern about frivolous suits
because "unfounded charges, or charges based on misconceptions or misunderstandings,
can wrongfully destroy careers, if not lives").
163. "[A] great deal of sexual harassment does not result in the filing of formal
charges." Juliano & Schwab, supra note 10, at 2 n.5 (citing Jane E. Larson & Jonathan A.
Knee, We Can Do Something About Sexual Harassment, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1991, at A21 (not-
ing that "only five to 10 percent of women who are sexually harassed ever formally
complain")).
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victims' extreme reluctance to file sexual harassment complaints. 64
Victims do not file sexual harassment claims because they are
"afraid of making waves, afraid of confrontation, and afraid of be-
ing retaliated against or losing their jobs,' 16 afraid of "reprisal and
blame, concern[ed] about loss of privacy, or the belief that nothing
would be done in response to the complaint," 66 even concerned for
the harasser because of the gravity of making a formal, public
complaint. Instead of filing claims, evidence demonstrates that
the most common response to sexual harassment is passivity and
silence. 16s As opposed to filing claims, sexual harassment victims
commonly change jobs. 69 They may also ignore the behavior or
ignore the harasser, tell the harasser to stop and make ajoke of the
behavior, or go along with the harassment.
In any event, protection against frivolous claims already exists.
There is no need to use the unwelcomeness element for this pur-
pose. The fact finder still has an obligation to determine the
credibility of both the target and the alleged harasser. Further-
more, in order to establish a quid pro quo claim successfully, the
plaintiff must prove that the acceptance or rejection of the unwel-
come sexual conduct resulted in tangible and detrimental
employment action. 7 ' Similarly, in order to establish a hostile envi-
ronment claim successfully, the plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a reasonable person would
consider the challenged conduct severe and pervasive. 7 2 The
court's assessment of both parties and all of the witnesses com-
bined with the inherent protections provided by the elements of
the respective claims will suffice to protect the alleged harasser
from the possibility of a frivolous claim.
Finally, the burden of proof is placed on the plaintiff even
though the plaintiffs are almost exclusively female, even though
164. See Radford, supra note 139, at 523 & nn.149, 150 (noting a study that indicated
that only five percent of the targets filed a formal complaint); Weiner, supra note 19, at 636
& n.71.
165. Weiner, supra note 19, at 636.
166. Radford, supra note 139, at 523.
167. See id. at 523 & n.152 (noting a researcher's comments: "Women are aware of the
gravity of making a formal, public complaint; women won't do that lightly. If there is a rea-
sonable excuse for a man's behavior, women are very forgiving.").
168. See Radford, supra note 139, at 523 & n.154 (noting a study that indicates that the
most common reaction of targets of sexual harassment is "passive"); Weiner, supra note 19,
at 627 & n.29, 636 & nn.71-73.
169. See Radford, supra note 139, at 523 & n.150.
170. See id. at 523 & nn.154-56.
171. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. See generally discussion supra Part
I.B.1.
172. See notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
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they are likely to be less powerful and more economically depend-
ent than men, even though psychological and sociological studies
indicate that "[w]omen tend to interpret a broader range of be-
haviors as constituting sexual harassment than do men,"1 73 and
even though men are more likely to initiate sexual behavior be-
cause they are less likely to view it as unwelcome.1 14 These findings
suggest that the presumption that sexual conduct at work is wel-
comed should be reversed in the context of sexual harassment and
that the burden of proving the more unlikely factual situation
should be placed on the actor, the person most likely to misinter-S • 175
pret the situation. If a man is likely to misunderstand a woman's
ambiguous behavior, then that man should have the burden of
making sure the conduct is welcome before proceeding, and at
trial he should have the burden of proving it objectively. The po-
tential perpetrator, or his employer, is in the best position to
control his actions and to guard against, prevent, and correct mis-
behavior. For these reasons, the burden of proving that the
challenged conduct is welcome should be on the defendant.
1 76
173. Radford, supra note 139, at 521-522 & nn.139, 141, 145 (citing a 1989 study noting
a "tendency among men to see promiscuous, seductive, and generally 'sexy' behavior-
where women see or intend to project only friendly and outgoing behavior," and noting
"clear and consistent" results ... showing that "[ M ]en, especially when observing women's
behaviors, were more likely to perceive sexual motives or intentions (flirtatiousness, prom-
iscuity, seductiveness, sexiness) than women"); see also Weiner, supra note 19, at 635.
174. Radford, supra note 139, at 521 & nn.140, 148 (citing a study noting that sixty-
seven percent of the males surveyed "said they would be 'flattered' if they were proposi-
tioned by a woman at work, while only seventeen percent of the women responded that they
would consider a proposition by a male flattering").
175. See id. at 543 (noting that courts should place the burden of proof on those who
would use power-oriented sexual conduct in the workplace because this would hold them
accountable for not determining in advance whether their conduct is acceptable to the
person toward whom they direct it); Weiner, supra note 19, at 635 & n.70 (noting a "study
[that] concluded that women who intend only to be affable will often be misinterpreted"
and that the "party who is trying to establish the more improbable set of facts ... ought to
have the burden of proof') (internal citations omitted).
176. See Estrich, supra note 19, at 839 (noting that in quid pro quo cases it hardly seems
too much to expect that as between the powerful blackmailer and his less powerful victim,
he, rather than she, should bear the burden of the blackmail); Radford, supra note 139, at
526 (noting that the burden of proving welcomeness rightly belongs to the person who
perpetrates the sexual conduct); see also Radford, supra note 140, 528 & n.179 (noting that
logic and social policy dictate that if existing problems cannot be alleviated without some-
one changing his or her behavior, the person causing the problem should be the one who is
forced to change, as is the case for drunk drivers). Some commentators may argue that
requiring the perpetrator to prove the welcomeness of his conduct is tantamount to assum-
ing him "guilty until proven innocent," but this argument ignores the fact that Title VII is
not a criminal statute aimed at punishing the harasser. Radford, supra note 139, at 545.
Rather, Title VII is designed to discourage employers from discriminating against employ-
ees on the basis of gender. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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The second problem is that the legal framework used to prove
that the challenged sexual conduct was unwelcome is used by the
defense to inflame the fact finder's prejudice through "intrusive,
irrelevant, [and] damaging" inquiries177 that may expose the plain-
tiff to "embarrassment, loss of privacy, and ... shame."'7 "
Distinguishing between sexual conduct that is welcome and sexual
conduct that is unwelcome is often difficult 79 because "the distinc-
tion between invited, uninvited-but-welcome, offensive-but-
tolerated, and flatly rejected" sexual advances is often elusive18° and
"presents difficult problems of proof [that] turn largely on credi-
bility determinations. ' l.. Frequently, what actually occurred is
unclear' 2 because the parties tell conflicting stories 1  and often
there are no percipient witnesses."" Defense attorneys may take
advantage of this difficulty and use it to convince the fact finder
that the plaintiff is unworthy of protection. Unscrupulous defense
attorneys may attempt to show that the plaintiff is either "a nut or a
177. Weiner, supra note 19, at 621.
178. Estrich, supra note 19, at 833.
179. See Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510-11 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[W]hat constitutes the
most blatant form of sexual harassment ... is not always answered easily.... [I]t is fre-
quently not clear what the facts actually are. The parties may tell totally conflicting stories,
in the trial court and elsewhere, and there are often no percipient witnesses. When there is
a dispute over what transpired, we rely on the findings of the fact-finder, unless those find-
ings are clearly wrong."); Radford, supra note 139, at 529 n.187 (noting that "sexual
advances and innuendoes are ambiguous: depending on their context, they may be in-
tended by the initiator, and perceived by the recipient, as denigrating or complimentary, as
threatening or welcome, as malevolent or innocuous") (citing EEOC Brief, supra, note 144
at E-5).
180. Barnes v. Costle, 561 E2d 983, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon,J., concurring).
See Nichols, 42 E3d at 510 ("Whether particular conduct is appropriate or whether it crosses
the line is the subject of disagreement and controversy, always heated and often legitimate.
Public opinion can change rapidly. It is quite possible for conduct that is acceptable today
to become unacceptable tomorrow. One's views are influenced by one's age, sex, national
origin, religion, philosophy, education, and experience. There is no uniform attitude to-
wards the role of sex nor any agreement on what is appropriate for inclusion in a code
governing sexual conduct.").
181. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986). Accord Cuesta v. Texas Dept. of
Criminal Justice, 805 F. Supp. 451, 455 (W.D. Tex. 1991) (noting that it is predictable in
sexual harassment cases for parties to enter into a "swearing match" where "[a] large part of
the [c]ourt's task consequently bec[omes] evaluating the testimony and determining whom
to believe" about "alleged activity [that usually] occurs in private, without documentation
and beyond the observation of third parties").
182. See Nichols, 42 F.3d at 511.
183. See id.
184. See id.
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slut"18 5 or attempt to stigmatize the plaintiffs as "liars and whores,
as vindictive and spiteful, as villains rather than victims."
18 6
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,"s7 the Court held that "a com-
plainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is ... obviously
relevant" to the unwelcomeness inquiry. The implication was that
if the Court found a woman's speech too inappropriate or her
dress too provocative, she would have to tolerate what would oth-
erwise be construed as sexual harassment. In effect, the Court
implied that a man may legally treat a woman with less respect if
the Court found that what she wore or what she said was "inappro-
priate; 8s a woman should beware of what she says and how she
dresses for fear that she may provoke a man's sexual advances. This
holding opened the door to evidentiary abuses. What the victim
wore, how she talked, and whom she slept with became the focus
185. Paul Nicholas Monnin, Proving Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual
History in Sexual Harassment Claims Under the 1994 Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence 412,
48 VANn. L. REv. 1155, 1156 n.1 (1995).
186. Estrich, supra note 19, at 813.
187. 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986).
188. Regarding what a court might regard as "inappropriate" dress, Estrich, supra note
19, at 828-29, makes the following observation:
What is "sexually provocative" dress? Does the Court mean that women who wear
short skirts intend to invite sexual advances? That tight sweaters may justly be pled as
provocation for otherwise offensive conduct? That men are legally entitled to treat
women whose clothes fit snugly with less respect than women whose clothes fit
loosely? By accepting the notion of "sexually provocative" clothing, the Court effec-
tively denies women the right to dress as they wish. Women who wear short skirts,
take pride in their own bodies, dress for themselves, go out directly from work, wear
hand-me-down clothes, have gained weight lately, or even are trying to be attractive
to their husbands and boyfriends are all, under the Court's view, presumed to wel-
come advances by any man on the job.
Regarding what a court might regard as "inappropriate," i.e., unfeminine, behavior,
Estrich adds:
A woman who behaves in the most stereotypical ways-complimenting men,
straightening their ties, "mov[ing] her body in a provocative manner," let alone eat-
ing dinner with the boss on a business trip, or remaining friendly even after rejecting
his advances-may find that the sexual advances she rejects are, as a matter of law,
not unwelcome. Similarly, women who act too much like men-who use "crude and
vulgar language," or choose to eat with the men in the employee lunchroom-
cannot be heard to complain of a work site which is "permeated by an extensive
amount of lewd and vulgar conversation and conduct." Their "unfeminine" behavior
apparently deprives them of protection, whatever the statutory mandate. Like
women in rape cases who have sexual pasts, their conduct makes them fair game.
Estrich, supra note 19, at 830.
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during discovery and at trial. s9 This had the effect of intimidating
women and forcing them to think twice before filing a legitimate
sexual harassment claim.'90 It placed the vulnerable female worker
on the defensive, always considering herself a potential victim, al-
ways on guard lest her conduct later be used to prove that she
incited or invited the actions of her harasser.'9' The victim was
forced to monitor every activity, including speech, dress, physical
contact, outside sexual activities, and even personal fantasies for
fear that her own actions might be used against her in the unwel-
comeness analysis.
192
These two problems may account for the reason sexual harass-
ment at work remains widespread, 9 even epidemic, 194 yet
189. See id. at 828.
190. See Monnin, supra note 185, at 1156 ("By disclosing the intimate details of plain-
tiffs' sex lives, defense lawyers, with the sanction of sexual harassment law, force claimants to
think twice about continuing their claims."); Weiner, supra note 19, at 636 n.74 ("Defense
lawyers ask questions about plaintiffs' sexual lives and personal habits in an effort both to
dig up behavior that courts would disapprove of and to intimidate women into not pressing
their claims.").
191. SeeWeiner, supra note 19, at 641.
192. See Radford, supra note 139, at 530; Weiner, supra note 19, at 641 ("[W]hen a fe-
male worker dresses to go to work in the morning, she should consider not only the
appropriateness of her attire on a professional level, but also whether her skirt is too short,
her high heels to high, or her sandals too revealing. .... When the worker interacts with her
colleagues and supervisors, she should refrain from making sexual remarks in even ajoking
manner. She should not touch any of her colleagues, nor allow any of them to touch her....
[W]hen the worker goes home at night, she should still be aware that her outside activities
could be used at some later time to show that she would welcome sexual interplay at work
or at least not be offended by it.") (quoting Radford, supra note 140, at 546).
193. See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 10, at 3 ("Widespread sexual harassment has
been documented for decades.") (citing Claire Safran, What Men Do to Women on the Job: A
Shocking Look at Sexual Harassment, REDBOOK, Nov. 1976, at 217 (noting that nine out of ten
women report they have experienced one or more forms of unwanted attention on the
job); BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 46 (1985) (noting that 53.1% of the
women identified themselves as victims of sexual harassment); Sexual Harassment in the
Federal Workplace, Trends, Progress, Continuing Challenges, U.S. Merit Systems Protection
Board at 13 (1995) (noting that 42% of women in a study of federal employees in 1980
reported having experienced harassing behavior; 42% in 1987; and 44% in 1994)).
194. "Sexual harassment in the workplace remains an epidemic."Juliano & Schwab, su-
pra note 10, at 2 (citing Andre Mouchard, Experts: Fewer harass at work, ORANGE COUNTY
REG., Feb. 10, 1996, at C1 (noting that "complaints about sex harassment are on the rise");
N.H. Sees Jump in Sex Complaints, BOSTON GLOBE, May 20, 1996, at 23 (noting that "greater
awareness is responsible for a 30 percent increase in the number of sexual harassment
complaints filed in New Hampshire in the past year")); Elizabeth Shogren, Sex Harassment
Message Often Unheeded, Many Women Contend; Workplace: Passes, groping and offensive comments
are still rampant but victims aren't confronting such conduct, LA. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1995, at 1. But
see Don Lee, Complaints of Sex Harassment Decline in State, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1996, at Al
(noting that the number of sexual harassment allegations filed with state employment
agencies have dipped 3 percent, ending a decade of consecutive increases).
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underreported.' 95 The fact that Title VII's protections remain
derutilized and ineffective and that victims remain forced to
choose between economic survival and sexual harassment suggests
a need to reform the legal framework that courts use to determine
whether conduct is actionable.
III. CHANGING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK COURTS USE TO
DETERMINE WHETHER CHALLENGED CONDUCT IS UNWELCOME
Courts should implement three reforms 96 to alleviate the two
problems associated with the legal framework that courts use to
determine whether challenged conduct is actionable.
195. See Estrich, supra note 19, at 833. "Complaints continue to pour into the EEOC,
and litigation in state and federal court has expanded." Juliano & Schwab, supra note 10, at
2 & n.4 ("In 1990, the Commission received 6,000 sexual harassment complaints. For both
1995 and 1996, the number jumped to more than 15,000 sexual harassment complaints.").
However, "a great deal of sexual harassment does not result in the filing of formal charges."
Id. at 2 n.5 (citing Jane E. Larson & Jonathan A. Knee, We Can Do Something About Sexual
Harassment, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1991, atA21 ("[O]nly 5 to 10 percent of women who are
sexually harassed ever formally complain.")). "[M] ost disputes are resolved without filing" a
claim, and "[m]ost filed cases are settled or dropped." Id. at 7 (citing Mark Galanter, The
Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3, 7 (1986) (citing Richard E. Miller & Aus-
tin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAw & Soc'Y REv.
525 (1981))). See also Monnin, supra note 185, at 1158 (noting that "research indicates that
sexual harassment remains a vastly underreported form of employment discrimination
despite the fact that the incidence of sexual misconduct in the workplace is quite high").
196. In contrast to the suggested reforms, some commentators suggest that the unwel-
comeness inquiry is unnecessary and unjustified. See Estrich, supra note 19, at 826-27; L.
Camille Hebert, Sexual Harassment is Gender Harassment, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 565, 587-88
(1995) (arguing that the law should not tolerate any sexual conduct in the workplace and
that eliminating the unwelcomeness requirement would "simply result in holding harassers
responsible for their inappropriate sexual behavior ... regardless of the actions of the tar-
get of the harassment").
Professor Estrich suggests that in quid pro quo cases, the inquiry is superfluous. By defi-
nition, in order for a plaintiff to state a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, a direct
connection between the sexual advances and the job benefit or loss must be established.
Estrich, supra note 19, at 831. Estrich suggests that the issue is not whether the conduct was
unwelcome but whether an employer used his or her power over the employee to coerce an
individual into intimate contact. See id. Estrich believes this would not bar consensual sex; it
would merely prohibit conditioning a job benefit upon sex. See id. at 832-33. She argues
that even if the employee had no problem trading sex for a promotion, it would be "very
difficult to argue" this kind of bargain is "worthy of protection." See id. at 832.
In hostile environment cases, Professor Estrich believes that the unwelcomeness inquiry
is "utterly gratuitous" "when the environment is not proven objectively to be hostile, be-
cause an unwelcome environment which is not objectively hostile does not give rise to
liability in any event." Estrich, supra note 19, at 833. If the conduct is not objectively unwel-
come, the inquiry into the complainant's personal sexual history would have invaded her
privacy, but it would not have resulted in liability. See id. Alternatively, the inquiry is "gratui-
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A. Shifting the Burden of Proving Unwelcomeness From
the Plaintiff to the Defendant
First, to alleviate the problems associated with placing the bur-
den of proof on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the challenged
conduct was unwelcome, the courts should shift the burden of
proof from the plaintiff to the harasser. Instead of requiring al-
leged victims of sexual harassment to prove that they did not
welcome the challenged conduct as part of their prima facie cases,
courts should presume that the conduct was unwelcome and require
the harasser, after the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, to prove
by objective evidence that the plaintiff affirmatively welcomed the
conduct.' 9v The defendant may prove that the conduct was wel-
come by showing that it was desirable or considered nonoffensive
or clearly solicited, incited, or consented to by the plaintiff. 98 Am-
biguous conduct such as silence, a polite "no," evasive behavior, or
failure to complain would not constitute affirmative evidence of
consent.'9
For example, in Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., °° the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the plaintiffs ini-
tial rejections of the defendant were "neither unpleasant nor
unambiguous, and gave [the defendant] no reason to believe that
his [conduct was] unwelcome.... After one misguided act, in
which he briefly fondled plaintiff's breast and was reprimanded by
her for doing so, he accepted his defeat and terminated all such
conduct."2 0 ' The conduct at issue consisted of the following: The
defendant would enter the plaintiff's office, shut and lock the
tously punitive," because even if the challenged conduct is proven objectively hostile, the
harasser may escape liability nonetheless by portraying the victim, through her conduct, as
unworthy of the protection. See id.
197. SeeRadford, supra note 139, at 932.
198. See supra note 112 and accompanying text; Radford, supra note 139, at 525. Some
commentators argue that requiring an employee to affirmatively and objectively determine
that his conduct is welcome before proceeding further would discourage and take the ro-
mance and spontaneity out of personal, social interactions. See Radford, supra note 139, at
545. But these limitations apply in the workplace, not in the social realm. See id. These inci-
dental restrictions serve a very important purpose-to maintain a working environment that
increases productivity by defining limits that respect all workers' rights to reach their great-
est potential without unnecessary and unwelcomed interference or distraction from others.
See id. Individuals expect some restrictions in situations where they deal with others. The
workplace is no different.
199. See Radford, supra note 139, at 532.
200. 913 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990).
201. Id. at 459.
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door, sit opposite her, and just stare at her. °2 He played with her
hair on several occasions.03 On one occasion, while she bent over
to get the mail, the defendant came up from behind her, grabbed
her waist, and said "I could drive you crazy."24 He frequently called
her at her home requesting that she meet him at various places.05
At a restaurant he insisted on sitting on the same side of the booth
as the plaintiff and, while waiting, he grabbed the plaintiff and at-
tempted to kiss her several times.2 0 After returning her to her
apartment building, he again attempted to kiss her and fondled
her breast.2°7 This conduct always occurred under the defendant's
pretext that they were engaging in work-related activities.200 The
plaintiff consistently, albeit politely, rejected each and every one of
the defendant's advances.209 The court still, however, affirmed the
finding that there was insufficient proof of unwelcomeness. °
The proposed reform would preclude such a finding. Under the
proposed reform, the plaintiffs polite refusals would be consid-
ered what they are: polite refusals. The defendant would not be
privileged to ignore a woman's words. If the defendant misinter-
preted "a short skirt, an interchange of jokes between two other
parties, or even knowledge about a target's outside sexual activities
as an invitation or consent," that would "never in itself be adequate
to Uustify sexual advances or to] show welcomeness. 21' Neither
would silence.1 2 To meet his burden of proof, the defendant would
213have to point to some affirmative act or clear language that
demonstrated by the preponderance of the evidence that the
plaintiff consented to the defendant's advances. Finally, if the evi-
dence turned out to be equally balanced or of equal probative
value, the facts would be construed in favor of the plaintiff instead
of the harasser because the burden of persuasion would fall upon
him.214
202. Id. at 460.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 459-60.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 460-61.
211. Radford, supra note 139, at 547.
212. See id. (noting that under the proposed reform, potential harassers would "not be
able to suggest that silence or pleasant refusals were actually mere masks of consent by the
target").
213. See Radford, supra note 139, at 547.
214. See id.
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Reforming the current legal framework by shifting the burden
of proof from the plaintiff to the harasser would encourage plain-
tiffs to file sexual harassment claims because they would not need
to face the indignity of the court's presumption that they wel-
comed, solicited, or incited the perpetrator. This reform would
help to break down outdated notions of what constitutes proper
female behavior and encourage courts to shift their foci from the
plaintiff to the detrimental effects of sexual harassment. Shifting
the burden of proof "would more appropriately satisfy the aims of
sexual harassment law" '15 and construe Title VII in a way that
broadens the "humanitarian and remedial purposes underlying
the federal proscription of employment discrimination,"216 helping
to transform the workplace into "a place where the privacy and
free choice of others not to be the targets of sexual advances takes
precedence over a worker's right to engage in sexual conduct."
217
Shifting the burden of proof would also be consistent with
changes that have already been made by Congress and the Judicial
Conference of the United States to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Amendments to the rules have shifted the burden of demonstrat-
ing the admissibility of evidence in sexual harassment cases from
the opponent to the proponent of the evidence, or from the sex-
ual harassment victim to the perpetrator.2 '8 These amendments are
part of the suggested reforms that will help alleviate the second
problem associated with the legal framework courts use to deter-
mine whether challenged conduct is unwelcome.
215. Id. at 499.
216. Barnes v. Cosfle, 561 F.2d 983, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
217. Radford, supra note 139, at 530.
218. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note ("The balancing test [in Rule 412]
... differs in three respects from ... Rule 403. First, it reverses ... Rule 403 by shifting the
burden to the proponent to demonstrate admissibility rather than making the opponent
justify exclusion of the evidence. Second, the standard ... is more stringent.., requiring
that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweigh the specified dangers. Fi-
nally, the Rule 412 test puts "harm to the victim" on the scale in addition to "prejudice to
the parties.").
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B. Restricting the Admissibility of Evidence by Narrowly Defining
"Relevance" and by Applying the Federal Rules of Evidence
Consistent with the Rationale Behind Amending Rule 412
and the Humanitarian and Remedial
Purposes Underlying Title VII
The second suggested reform would alleviate the defense attor-
neys' temptation to exploit the various difficulties associated with
the legal framework used to prove that the challenged conduct was
unwelcome. The reform consists of two parts, one substantive and
one procedural. The substantive reform involves using the Federal
Rules of Evidence to significantly narrow the content of the evidence
that a perpetrator may introduce to show that the challenged con-
duct was welcome. Courts should more narrowly define what is
"relevant" pursuant to Rules 4012'9 and 402220 for purposes of sex-
ual harassment, and if evidence tending to embarrass, shame, or
invade the privacy of a victim remains admissible pursuant to 403221
or 404222 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts should use Rule 412
as a tool to exclude such evidence, consistent with the humanitar-
ian and remedial purposes underlying the Rule and Title VII.
219. Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence reads as follows: "'Relevant evidence'
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." Fed. P. Evid. 401.
220. Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence reads as follows: "All relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of
Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Fed. R. Evid. 402.
221. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence reads as follows: "Although relevant, evi-
dence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Fed. R Evid.
403.
222. Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence reads as follows:
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the pur-
pose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion ....
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissi-
ble for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Fed. R. Evid. 404.
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Proving that the challenged conduct was unwelcome is an evi-
dentiary issue.22 Evidence, to be admissible, must be relevant to
the issue for which it was proposed. In making the relevancy de-
termination under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, some
courts have considered the plaintiffs sexual activities outside ofthe wrk "224
the work environment. They have also considered evidence of a
plaintiffs past sexual conduct with the alleged harasser.2l Evidence
of the harasser's past sexual conduct with other employees has
been excluded, 26 but evidence of the plaintiffs past sexual con-
duct with other employees has not been similarly barred. 7
Defining "relevant" evidence this broadly encourages tactical
abuses.
To curb the defense's opportunity to abuse the plaintiff, courts
should redefine "relevance." Courts should exclude evidence of
the plaintiffs sexual activities outside of the workplace 228 unless the
activities involve the alleged harasser.22 9 "In an action for sexual
223. See Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Development,
New EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment
Under Title VII, 61 B.U.L. REv. 535, 561 (1981) (noting that "[w]hether the advances are
unwelcome.., becomes an evidentiary question")).
224. See, e.g., Walker v. Sullair Corp., 736 F. Supp. 94, 98 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (finding
plaintiff's discussions about her sex life and sexual fantasies and reports regarding the sex-
ual content of her dates relevant to the welcomeness inquiry); Mitchell, 116 ER.D. at 483
(allowing the deposition of "a photographer who ha[d] allegedly taken sexually suggestive
pictures of one or more of the plaintiffs").
225. See, e.g., Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding., 867 F.2d 1311, 1313 (lth Cir. 1989)
(admitting evidence that plaintiff sent a sexually explicit gift to the alleged harasser);
Swentek v. USAir Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that provocative speech and
dress is relevant in determining welcomeness but only when it bears directly on the plain-
tiff's contact with the alleged harasser).
226. See, e.g., Stahl v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 19 F.3d 533, 539 (10th Cir. 1994) (exclud-
ing evidence of the accused supervisor's sexual conduct with someone other than the
plaintiff); Kelly-Zurian v. Woht Shoe Co., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457, 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting a motion in limine to exclude
evidence of any alleged claims of sexual harassment against the alleged harasser by anyone).
227. See, e.g., Weiss v. Amoco Oil Co., 142 F.R.D. 311, 315 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (finding that
discovery of information concerning plaintiff's past sexual conduct with other co-workers
was acceptable); Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481, 483 (D. Utah 1987) (noting that past
sexual history, if known by the alleged harasser, could "have a bearing on what conduct [the
defendant] thought was welcome" and allowing discovery of evidence that a co-worker had
allegedly been fondled by the plaintiff); Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., Inc., 28 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 639 (admitting evidence that plaintiff had been fired from previous job for
propositioning a married man to show that she was the sexual aggressor).
228. See, e.g., Kelly-Zurian v. Whole Shoes, 27 Cal.2d 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
no abuse of discretion to exclude evidence that plaintiff watched X-rated videotapes, had an
abortion, and participated in sexual conduct with non-employees as irrelevant and unduly
prejudicial).
229. See, e.g., Sardigal v. St. Louis Nat'l Stockyards Co., 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 497, 502
(S.D. Ill. 1986) (admitting evidence that plaintiff visited alleged harasser alone at night in
non-employment contexts); Evans v. Mail Handlers, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 634, 637
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harassment... while some evidence of the alleged victim's sexual
behavior and/or predisposition in the workplace may perhaps be
relevant, non-workplace conduct will usually be irrelevant.
2 30
For example, evidence that a plaintiff fondled the defendant
hours before he crept up from behind her and kissed her would
be admissible to show that the kiss was welcomed by the plaintiff
because evidence of fondling has a tendency to make the defen-
dant's claim that the conduct was welcome more probable than it
would be without that evidence. However, evidence that a woman
posed nude in a national magazine outside of working hours
should not be relevant to the issue of welcomeness of sexual ad-
vances at work because it does not make it more probable,
necessarily, that she will welcome any sexual advances from her co-
workers or employer at work.2 3' This is particularly true where the
plaintiff never engaged in sexual dialogue or gestures. The fact
that she posed nude should not be equated with "lawful acquies-
cence to unwanted sexual advances."
232
Evidence of the plaintiffs sexual activities with the defendant
should be considered relevant but only if it is linked temporally to
the challenged conduct and when it is reciprocal in kind and de-
gree to the harasser's sexual advances. For example, if the parties
had a prior sexual relationship, that relationship should not be
relevant with regard to the challenged conduct on a separate, later
233
occasion if the relationship had ended. Otherwise, consent on
one prior occasion would, in effect, give the defendant a sexual
right to the plaintiff at will and in perpetuity. Similarly, if the plain-
tiff has engaged and interacted with the alleged harasser, that
conduct should not be relevant if it is not of the same type
(D.D.C. 1983) (admitting evidence of off-premises consensual sexual relations with alleged
harasser).
230. FED. R. EvID. 412, advisory committee's note (citing Burns v. McGregor Elec. Ind.,
Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 962-63 (8th Cir. 1993)).
231. See Burns v. McGregor Elec. Ind., Inc., 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding it was
inadmissible to consider the plaintiff's choice to pose nude for a national magazine on her
personal time to show plaintiff was not the kind of person that would find the challenged
work-related conduct offensive when she had never told sexual stories or engaged in sexual
gestures at work). See also FED. R. EvID. 412 advisory committee's note (citing Burns with
approval and noting that posing for a nude magazine outside work hours is irrelevant to
issue of unwelcomeness of sexual advances at work).
232. Burns, 989 E2d 959, 963; Katz v. Dole 709 F.2d 251, 254 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983) ("A per-
son's private and consensual sexual activities do not constitute a waiver of his or her legal
protections against unwelcome and unsolicited sexual harassment.").
233. See Shrout v Black Clawson Co., 689 F. Supp. 774, 779 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (finding
prior sexual relationship between the parties irrelevant because the offensive conduct oc-
curred after the relationship was terminated).
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or degree. The fact that the plaintiff had baked the defendant a
birthday cake, given him a card signed "love," and even given him
a picture of herself in a belly dancing costume should not be rele-
vant if the reciprocate act was forcing himself upon her.3 4
As to evidence of defendant's sexual conduct with third parties
in the workplace, that evidence should only be considered relevant
if it corroborates the plaintiff's claim23 5 because Rule 412 only ap-
plies to "victims" of sexual misconduct. 2 3  It does not protect the
perpetrator. Rather, it only protects an individual who "can reasona-
bly be characterized as a 'victim of alleged sexual misconduct.' ,237
Finally, evidence of the plaintiff's sexual conduct with third par-
ties in the workplace should be excluded.23 s The EEOC has noted
that evidence of the complainant's general character and past sex-
ual behavior toward others is considered to have limited, if any,
234. SeeWangler v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 742 F. Supp. 1458, 1465 (D. Haw. 1990).
235. For decisions supporting this view, see Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding that the district court should have permitted evidence of the supervi-
sor's harassment of other women at work because it was relevant to show that he viewed
female workers as sexual objects); Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, 913 F.2d 456, 459 (7th
Cir. 1990) (admitting evidence that other female workers were subject to the same harassing
conduct complained of by the plaintiff); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.
Supp. 1486, 1499 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (noting that evidence that other female co-workers were
sexually harassed by the same individual is relevant); Cuesta v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Jus-
tice, 805 F Supp. 451, 455-56 (W.D. Tex. 1991) (admitting evidence by other women who
worked at the same office that the defendant routinely harassed them in a similar fashion).
236. See FED. R. EvID. 401(b) (2) ("In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual
behavior or sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admis-
sible under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to
any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party.") (emphasis added).
237. FED. R. EvID. 401 advisory committee's note ("Rule 412 does not.., apply unless
the person against whom the evidence is offered can reasonably be characterized as a 'vic-
tim of alleged sexual misconduct.'").
238. For decisions supporting this view, see Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132
E3d 848, 855-56 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding evidence that the plaintiff had "engag[ed] in mul-
tiple affairs with married men, [w]as a lesbian, and [w]as suffering from a sexually
transmitted disease" inadmissible); Stacks v. SW Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1326-
27 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding evidence of plaintiff's affair with a married co-worker was inad-
missible to show that such workplace conduct did not offend her); Swentek v. USAIR, Inc.,
830 E2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding it was improper for the district court to admit
evidence of general, past sexual behavior at work with other co-workers and supervisors to
show plaintiff was the kind of person who could not be offended by the challenged conduct
and thus welcomed the harasser's conduct on unrelated occasions); Howard v. Historic
Tours, 177 F.R.D. 48, 51 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding an inquiry into plaintiff's sexual behavior
with other employees irrelevant and minimally probative); Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand &
Gravel Co., 895 F Supp. 105, 107 (E.D. Va. 1995) (excluding testimony from co-workers that
plaintiff had engaged in sexually explicit conversations with them); Stalnaker v. Kmart
Corp., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 705 (BNA) (D. Kan. 1996) (noting that questions to female
witnesses about their sexual or romantic activities would be inadmissible under Rule 412).
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probative value. s9 If the harasser did not know about the plaintiffs
sexual conduct with co-workers, then any evidence as to such con-
duct could not possibly affect the harasser's perception and
consequential behavior 240 and could not be relevant because what
is unknown cannot make anything more probable than not. If the
harasser did know about the plaintiffs conduct with co-workers, to
find such evidence relevant, one would have to say that previous
sexual behavior or history with one co-worker would make it more
probable than not that the plaintiff would welcome a similar rela-
tionship with any other employee. Reality and experience belie
241this conclusion.
Evidence may also be admissible pursuant to Rule 404 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 404 prohibits the introduction of
"[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of his character ...
for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion." 242 For example, a plaintiff could not present
evidence of a defendant's propensity to pick fights with his
neighbors for the purpose of proving that on the particular day in
question, the defendant acted in conformity with his propensity
and assaulted his wife. Similarly, proof that sexual conduct was wel-
come on prior occasions cannot be admitted to show that conduct
243
was welcome on the specific occasion at issue.
Rule 404(b), however, allows a party to introduce character evi-
dence for purposes other than to prove action in conformity
therewith.244 Such evidence may be introduced to prove motive or
intent.24 Evidence of specific instances of prior conduct that dem-
246
onstrate character is the most convincing form of such evidence.
Thus, specific instances of prior sexual conduct with the alleged
239. See EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment (Mar. 19, 1990), reprinted in 8
Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:6687.
240. See Howard, 177 FR.D. at 51.
241. See id.
242. FED. R. EvID. 404(a).
243. See Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 758 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (holding that evidence of
prior sexual relationships is not admissible to prove victim engaged in similar conduct on a
particular occasion). Rule 404(a) is consistent with Rule 412's ban on reputation evidence.
See FED. R. EvID. 412(b) (2) ("Evidence of an alleged victim's reputation is admissible only if
it has been placed in controversy by the alleged victim.").
244. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissi-
ble to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, in-
tent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident...
245. See id.
246. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's notes ("Of the three methods of
proving character... evidence of specific instances is the most convincing.").
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harasser may be admissible for those purposes. For example, in
Heyne v. Caruso,4 7 the court held that specific acts of sexual har-
assment by the defendant of other female employees were not
admissible to prove that the defendant sexually harassed the plain-
tiff on the particular occasion in question.248 These acts, however,
were admissible to prove intent and motive.24 9 The evidence would
be relevant and probative of the defendant's general disrespect of
his female employees and of his motive for firing the plaintiff after
she rejected his advances.' °
If evidence is otherwise admissible, then the court must balance
the probative force of the evidence against its prejudicial impact by
applying Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 412 reads as
follows:
The following evidence is not admissible in any civil ... pro-
ceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct... (1) Evidence
offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other
sexual behavior. (2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged
victim's sexual pre-disposition ... Except ... in a civil case,
evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual pre-
disposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise
admissible under these rules and its probative value substantially
outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair preju-
dice to any party.
2 1
Rule 412's requirement that evidence be more probative than
prejudicial should be viewed as modifying and potentially exclud-
ing more evidence than Rule 403, which precludes the
introduction of admissible evidence if its prejudicial impact substan-
tially outweighs its probative value. 52 Rule 412 differs in three
respects from Rule 403. Rule 412 shifts the burden of demonstrat-
ing the evidence's admissibility from the opponent to the
proponent of the evidence; the standard has significantly more
"bite" than Rule 403's because it requires that the evidence's pro-
bative value substantially outweigh the likelihood of harm or
prejudice; and finally, it requires the court to examine the harm to
247. 69 E3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1995).
248. See id. at 1480.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. FED. R. EVID. 412(a), (b) (emphasis added).
252. See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.) (emphasis
added).
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the victim as well as the prejudice to the parties. While Rule 403
favors the admission of evidence, allowing a party to introduce evi-
dence that is slightly less probative than prejudicial, Rule 412
disfavors the admission of evidence, strengthening Rule 403's stan-
dard to account for the prejudicial and devastating nature of the
kind of evidence the welcomeness inquiry elicits.5 4
Rule 412 was amended 25 to encourage sexual harassment vic-
tims to institute and utilize Title VII's protections by shielding
victims from invasion of privacy, embarrassment, sexual stereotyp-
ing, and sexual innuendo.256 Unless the probative value of the
evidence substantially outweighs possible harm to the victim, Rule
412 should bar evidence which involves actual physical conduct,
activities of the mind such as fantasies or dreams, evidence that
may have a sexual connotation for the fact finder, evidence tend-
ing to sexually stereotype, evidence relating to the alleged victim's
mode of dress, speech, or lifestyle, and evidence geared to embar-
rass the victim.257 To further protect the victim from unnecessary
253. See FED. R. EVID. advisory committee's note ("The balancing test . .. differs in
these respects from... Rule 403. First, it Reverses ... Rule 403 by shifting the burden to the
proponent to demonstrate admissibility rather than making the opponent justify exclusion
of the evidence. Second, the standard ... is more stringent... requiring that the probative
value of the evidence substantially outweigh the specified dangers. Finally, the Rule 412 test
puts 'harm to the victim' on the scale in addition to 'prejudice to the parties."').
254. See Monnin, supra note 185, at 1160.
255. Note that Rule 412 was amended in 1994 to increase the sexual harassment vic-
tims' evidentiary protections. For an excellent analysis of the historical debate surrounding
Rule 412's deficiencies and its subsequent amendment, see Monnin, supra note 185, at
1161-68, 1177.
256. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note ("Rule 412 has been revised to ...
expand the protection afforded alleged victims of sexual misconduct.., to safeguard the
alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyp-
ing that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of
sexual innuendo into the fact-finding process. By affording victims protection in most in-
stances, the rule also encourages victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to participate
in legal proceedings against alleged offenders.").
257. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note ("Past sexual behavior connotes all
activities that involve actual physical conduct, i.e. sexual intercourse or sexual contact....
This amendment is designed to exclude evidence that.., the proponent believes may have
a sexual connotation for the fact finder [because] ... such evidence would contravene Rule
412's objectives of shielding the alleged victim from potential embarrassment and safe-
guarding the victim against stereotypical thinking ... evidence such as that relating to the
alleged victim's mode of dress, speech, or life-style will not be admissible."). See, e.g., United
States v. Galloway, 937 E2d 542 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding use of contraceptives inadmissible
because use implied sexual activity); United States v. One Feather, 702 F2d 736 (8th Cir.
1983) (disallowing evidence of birth of an illegitimate child); State v. Carmichael, 727 P.2d
918, 925 (Kan. 1986) (disallowing evidence of venereal disease).
In addition, the word "behavior" should be construed to include activities of the mind,
such as fantasies or dreams. See 23 C. Wright and K Graham, Jr, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 5384 at 548 (1980) ("While there may be some doubt under statutes that require 'conduct,' it
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intrusion, courts should diligently apply the relevant evidence and
procedural rules.
C. Protecting the Victim's Privacy by Diligently Applying the Procedural
Protections Provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure
The third and final suggested reform is procedural. Courts
should protect the sexual harassment victim's privacy by diligently
applying the procedural protections provided by the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 412 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence states the following:
A party intending to offer evidence ... must... file a written
motion at least 14 days before trial specifically describing the evi-
dence and stating the purpose for which it is offered....
Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must
conduct a hearing in camera.... The motion, related papers,
and the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain un-
der seal unless the court orders otherwise.258
In Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co., 59 the court punished the
defendant for his callous and flagrant disregard of Rule 412's pro-
cedural safeguards. 260 The court noted that Rule 412 was designed
to protect victims against the negative repercussions of publicly
disclosing intimate sexual details by precluding evidence of sexu-
ally provocative discussions and activities in the workplace with
anyone other than the defendant.261 In Sheffield, the defendant had
thoughtlessly filed his motion, describing with particularity the
evidence it sought to introduce, without placing the documents
under seal. 62 The documents automatically became a matter of
public record, invading the plaintiff's privacy, and the defendant
failed to articulate a single reason for excusing his reprehensible
conduct.2 6 Like the court in Sheffield, courts should diligently en-
would seem that the language of Rule 412 is broad enough to encompass the behavior of
the mind.").
258. FED. R. EvIn. 412(c)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
259. 895 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Va. 1995).
260. See id. at 109.
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See id.
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force Rule 412's procedural protections to protect the victim's pri-
vacy and to control the form in which this evidence is presented by
requiring that motions thoroughly describe the evidence and their
proffered purpose, that these motion be filed under seal, and that
admissibility determinations be made in camera.
The shame and embarrassment that inhibits plaintiffs from in-
voking Title VII's legal remedies "exist[] equally at the discovery
stage as at trial., 2'  Thus the policies underlying Rule 412 should
inform the application of discovery and procedural rules which
may be implicated in sexual harassment cases. 65 Rule 26(b)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits "discovery regarding any
matter ... which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action" and which is "reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence," even if that information is not
admissible at trial. 6 Rule 26 (c) instructs the courts to presump-
tively issue "confidentiality orders" and "protective orders barring
discovery unless the party seeking discovery makes a showing that
the evidence" is "relevant" and "cannot be obtained except
through discovery."267 Rule 26 (c) reads as follows:
Upon motion by a party ... accompanied by a certification
that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to
confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the
dispute without court action, and for good cause shown ...
the court may make any order which justice requires to protect a party
or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or un-
due burden ... including ... that certain matters not be
inquired into, or that the scope of the disclosure or discovery
be limited to certain matters.., that a deposition, after being
sealed, be opened only by order of the court ... [and] that
264. Howardv. Historic Tours of Am., 177 F.R.D. 48,51 (D.D.C. 1997).
265. See id. at 50 (citing FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note) ("In order not to
undermine the rationale of Rule 412, courts should enter appropriate orders pursuant to
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) to protect the victim against unwarranted inquiries and to ensure con-
fidentiality."). See also FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note ("The procedures set
forth ... do not apply to discovery ... which will be continued to be governed by FED. R.
Civ. P. 26. In order not to undermine the rationale of Rule 412, however, courts should
enter appropriate orders pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) to protect the victim against un-
warranted inquiries and to ensure confidentiality. Courts should presumptively issue
protective orders barring discovery unless the party seeking discovery makes a showing that
the evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant under the facts and theories of the
particular case, and cannot be obtained except through discovery.... Confidentiality orders
should be presumptively granted as well.").
266. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
267. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
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the parties simultaneously file specified documents or infor-
mation enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed
by the court.
2
,
In Sanchez v. Zabihz2 69 the court recognized the interplay between
Rule 412 and Rule 26(b) and (c). 270 The court used these rules to
limit the extent of the defendant's interrogatories.2 7' The defen-
dant wanted the plaintiff to tell him whether she had any personal,
romantic, or sexual interactions with any co-workers in the last ten
272years. The court struck the word "personal" from the record, de-
nied any discovery relating to a co-worker who later became her
husband, and limited the time period to three years. 27' The court
also required that the answers be given under oath, sealed, and
submitted only to defendant's attorney who was prohibited from
divulging the information to anyone, including the defendant,
without first filing a motion, submitting to a hearing, and waiting
for a court order.274 As in Sanchez, discovery rules should be used to
protect the complainant's privacy and to narrow the form and the
content of that which is discoverable in sexual harassment cases.
Applying the rules in the manner suggested is consistent with
the Court's holding in Vinson that evidence of provocative conduct
is relevant to the unwelcomeness inquiry2 75 but excludable if un-
duly prejudicial.276 Applying the rules in the manner suggested
would alleviate the "intrusive, irrelevant, and damaging" inquir-
ies277 that may expose the complainant to "embarrassment, loss of
privacy, and shame" 27 because it will not allow the perpetrator to
unnecessarily humiliate, insult, or violate the victim's privacy. Evi-
dence about how the plaintiff dressed, talked, or with whom she
268. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(4), (6), (7) (emphasis added).
269. 166 ER.D. 500 (N.M. 1996).
270. See id. at 501-02.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See id. at 502.
274. See id. at 502-03.
275. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69 (holding that evidence of plaintiff's speech and dress are
"obviously" relevant and "[w]hile the District Court must carefully weigh the applicable
considerations in deciding whether to admit evidence of this kind, there is no per se rule
against its admissibility").
276. See id., 477 U.S. at 69 (noting that evidence of provocative speech and dress should
be admitted with caution in light of the potential for unfair prejudice). See also Fed. R. Evid.
412 (Evidence of past sexual behavior is inadmissible if "its probative value substantially
outweighs the danger of... unfair prejudice to any party.") (emphasis added).
277. Weiner, supra note 19, at 621.
278. Estrich, supra note 19, at 833.
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slept would be inadmissable.27 9 As would evidence that the plaintiff
was promiscuous and thus unworthy of credibility or protection.280
If Tide VII claims are to have any real meaning, the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be inter-
preted to protect the victims of sexual harassment and to limit the
harasser's power to intimidate and discourage the filing of legiti-
mate claims. 81
CONCLUSION
Increasingly, women are coming forward to change the cultural
climate and to compel employers to stop sexual harassment. Title
VII was enacted to provide women, among others, with equal em-
ployment opportunities in the form of a workplace free from
sexual discrimination. Sexual harassment is one of the most dam-
aging forms of sexual discrimination. Both quid pro quo and
hostile environment sexual harassment claims require that the
plaintiff prove that the challenged conduct was unwelcome. The
legal framework courts use to determine whether challenged con-
duct is unwelcome, however, has created two problems which keep
sexual harassment widespread and underreported.
First, placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove that
the harassment was unwelcome is unfair because it presumes, de-
spite contrary evidence, that women generally welcome sexual
behavior in the workplace. It perpetuates pernicious and demean-
ing sexual stereotypes such as woman as provocateur, woman as the
scorned and vengeful lover, and woman as the one who is to blame
for the sexual affronts of well-meaning man. Title VII was crafted
to protect women as victims in the area of employment because, as
a result of discriminatory stereotypes, they, as a group, are gener-
ally less powerful and more economically dependent than men
and because men and the employers who place them in positions
of authority are in the best position to control offensive behavior
279. Id.
280. SeeWeiner, supra note 19 at 630-31.
281. See Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 761-62 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (noting that "employees
whose intimate lives are unjustifiably and offensively intruded upon in the workplace might
face the 'Catch-22' of invoking their statutory rights only at the risk of enduring further
intrusions into irrelevant details of their personal lives .... By carefully examining our ex-
perience with rape prosecutions, however, the courts and bar can avoid repeating in this
new field of civil sexual harassment suits the same mistakes that are now being corrected in
the rape context").
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and to avoid an unintentional violation of Title VII's prohibitions.
For this reason, the courts should shift the burden of proving that
the challenged conduct was unwelcome from the target to the ag-
gressor. Instead of presuming that the plaintiff solicited, invited, or
consented to the sexual advance and making proof of unwelcome-
ness a part of the complainant's prima facie case, courts should
require the harasser to show, as part of an affirmative defense and
by objective evidence, that plaintiff's affirmative acts clearly indi-
cated her consent to the challenged sexual advances. Silence,
polite refusals, or evasive behavior would not constitute affirmative
objective acts justifying the conclusion that the defendant's con-
duct was welcome.
Second, to discourage the defense from using the unwelcome-
ness element and the legal framework the courts use to determine
whether the challenged conduct is welcome as a defense tactic to
inflame the fact finder's prejudice, the courts should implement
two additional reforms, one substantive and one procedural.
Substantively, the courts should redefine what is considered
"relevant" evidence in sexual harassment cases for discovery and
trial purposes. Rules 401 and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
should be used to include evidence narrowly tailored to the pur-
pose for which it is offered. Evidence of the plaintiff's conduct
outside of the workplace should be excluded unless it involves the
defendant. Sexual conduct with the defendant should be consid-
ered relevant but only if it is limited temporally and if it is
reciprocal in kind and degree. The defendant's sexual conduct
with other employees should be excluded unless it corroborates
the plaintiffs claim. Finally, the plaintiffs sexual conduct with co-
workers should be excluded. If evidence tending to embarrass,
shame, or invade the plaintiffs privacy is technically admissible
pursuant to Rules 403 and 404, then Rule 412 should be used as a
tool to exclude such evidence.
Procedurally, the courts should apply, without fail, the protec-
tions provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to protect the plaintiff from embarrassment, inva-
sion of privacy, and shame by making admissibility determinations
in camera, by requiring that motions for admission of evidence
thoroughly describe the evidence and its proffered purpose, by
requiring that these motions be filed under seal, and by liberally
granting confidentiality and protective orders barring discovery
unless the evidence is relevant and cannot be obtained otherwise.
Implementing these reforms would broaden the humanitarian
and remedial purposes of Title VII and encourage victims of sexual
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harassment to come forward and file legitimate claims. The in-
creased filing of legitimate sexual harassment claims, in turn,
should reduce the incidence of sexual harassment. Like the
woman on the bus who assertively challenges her harasser, working
women in America may assert their rights to be free from un-
wanted sexual attention in the workplace with assurance that the
law will protect them from further economic or professional devas-
tation.

